Tight Regret Bounds for Fixed-Price Bilateral Trade

We examine fixed-price mechanisms in bilateral trade through the lens of regret minimization. Our main results are twofold. (i) For independent values, a near-optimal $\widetilde{\Theta}(T^{2/3})$ tight bound for $\textsf{Global Budget Balance}$ fixed-price mechanisms with two-bit/one-bit feedback. (ii) For correlated/adversarial values, a near-optimal $\Omega(T^{3/4})$ lower bound for $\textsf{Global Budget Balance}$ fixed-price mechanisms with two-bit/one-bit feedback, which improves the best known $\Omega(T^{5/7})$ lower bound obtained in the work [BCCF24] and, up to polylogarithmic factors, matches the $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3 / 4})$ upper bound obtained in the same work. Our work in combination with the previous works [CCCFL24mor, CCCFL24jmlr, AFF24, BCCF24] (essentially) gives a thorough understanding of regret minimization for fixed-price bilateral trade. En route, we have developed two technical ingredients that might be of independent interest: (i) A novel algorithmic paradigm, called $\textit{{fractal elimination}}$, to address one-bit feedback and independent values. (ii) A new $\textit{lower-bound construction}$ with novel proof techniques, to address the $\textsf{Global Budget Balance}$ constraint and correlated values.