Related papers: Robust Price Discrimination

We consider a mechanism design setting with a single item and a single buyer who is uncertain about the value of the item. Both the buyer and the seller have a common model for the buyer's value, but the buyer discovers her true value only…

First-price auctions have largely replaced traditional bidding approaches based on Vickrey auctions in programmatic advertising. As far as learning is concerned, first-price auctions are more challenging because the optimal bidding strategy…

We study a contextual version of the repeated brokerage problem. In each interaction, two traders with private valuations for an item seek to buy or sell based on the learner's-a broker-proposed price, which is informed by some contextual…

Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, who wish to trade a good. We study this problem from the perspective of a profit-maximizing broker within an online learning framework,…

Sequential posted pricing auctions are popular because of their simplicity in practice and their tractability in theory. A usual assumption in their study is that the Bayesian prior distributions of the buyers are known to the seller, while…

Using data obtained in a controlled ad-auction experiment that we ran, we evaluate the regret-based approach to econometrics that was recently suggested by Nekipelov, Syrgkanis, and Tardos (EC 2015). We found that despite the weak…

We study a setting where agents use no-regret learning algorithms to participate in repeated auctions. \citet{kolumbus2022auctions} showed, rather surprisingly, that when bidders participate in second-price auctions using no-regret bidding…

Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been considered either when the bidder values are i.i.d., or when each bidder is individually identifiable via her value distribution. The latter is a reasonable approach when…

We study the dynamic pricing problem with knapsack, addressing the challenge of balancing exploration and exploitation under resource constraints. We introduce three algorithms tailored to different informational settings: a Boundary…

To choose between two discrete goods, a consumer pays attention to only those with prices below a threshold. From these, she chooses her most preferred good. We assume consumers in a population have the same preference but may have…

We consider dynamic pricing with covariates under a generalized linear demand model: a seller can dynamically adjust the price of a product over a horizon of $T$ time periods, and at each time period $t$, the demand of the product is…

We study the limits of an information intermediary in the classical Bayesian auction, where a revenue-maximizing seller sells one item to $n$ buyers with independent private values. In addition, we have an intermediary who knows the buyers'…

In this paper, we study the problem of fair sequential decision making with biased linear bandit feedback. At each round, a player selects an action described by a covariate and by a sensitive attribute. The perceived reward is a linear…

We consider combinatorial multi-item markets and propose the notion of a $\Delta$-regret Walras equilibrium, which is an allocation of items to players and a set of item prices that achieve the following goals: prices clear the market, the…

Motivated by the application of real-time pricing in e-commerce platforms, we consider the problem of revenue-maximization in a setting where the seller can leverage contextual information describing the customer's history and the product's…

When selling many goods with independent valuations, we develop a distributionally robust framework, consisting of a two-player game between seller and nature. The seller has only limited knowledge about the value distribution. The seller…

We study revenue maximization when a seller offers $k$ identical units to ex ante heterogeneous, unit-demand buyers. While anonymous pricing can be $\Theta(\log k)$ worse than optimal in general multi-unit environments, we show that this…

We build on theoretical results from the mechanism design literature to analyze empirical models of second-degree price discrimination (2PD). We show that for a random-coefficients discrete choice ("BLP") model to be suitable for studying…

In this paper, we study the contextual dynamic pricing problem where the market value of a product is linear in its observed features plus some market noise. Products are sold one at a time, and only a binary response indicating success or…

We investigate a seller's revenue-maximizing mechanism in a setting where a desirable good is sold together with an undesirable bad (e.g., advertisements) that generates third-party revenue. The buyer's private information is…