Related papers: An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching
Properties of stable matchings in the popular random-matching-market model have been studied for over 50 years. In a random matching market, each agent has complete preferences drawn uniformly and independently at random. Wilson (1972),…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings.…
This paper studies decision-making and statistical inference for two-sided matching markets via matrix completion. In contrast to the independent sampling assumed in classical matrix completion literature, the observed entries, which arise…
A seller offers an asset in a decentralised market. Buyers have private signals about their common value. I study whether the market becomes allocatively more efficient with (i) more buyers, (ii) better-informed buyers. Both increase the…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
This paper investigates a setup consisting of multiple transmitters serving multiple cache-enabled clients through a linear network, which covers both wired and wireless transmission situations. We investigate decentralized coded caching…
Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…
Fair division is typically framed from a centralized perspective. However, in practice resource allocation often occurs via decentralized networks. We study a decentralized variant of fair division inspired by altruistic dynamics observed…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
This paper develops a method to use singles' data in a non-parametric revealed preference setting of collective household choice. We use it to test the controversial assumption of preference stability between singles and couples, without…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
Decentralized recommender system does not rely on the central service provider, and the users can keep the ownership of their ratings. This article brings the theoretically well-studied matrix factorization method into the decentralized…
Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst-case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large…
Decentralized data markets can provide more equitable forms of data acquisition for machine learning. However, to realize practical marketplaces, efficient techniques for seller selection need to be developed. We propose and benchmark…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…