Related papers: An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching
This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism --which is…
In modern data center networks, thousands of hosts contend for shared link capacity; the scale of these systems makes centralized scheduling impractical. This article models such scheduling as a bipartite matching problem under…
We study the loan contracts offered by decentralised loan protocols (DLPs) through the lens of financial derivatives. DLPs, which effectively are clearinghouses, facilitate transactions between option buyers (i.e. borrowers) and option…
We model the ultimate price paid by users of a decentralized ledger as resulting from a two-stage game where Miners (/Proposers/etc.) first purchase blockspace via a Tullock contest, and then price that space to users. When analyzing our…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
Duality of linear programming is a standard approach to the classical weighted maximum matching problem. From an economic perspective, the dual variables can be regarded as prices of products and payoffs of buyers in a two-sided matching…
Consider the object allocation (one-sided matching) model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). When final allocations are observed but agents' preferences are unknown, when might the allocation be in the core? This is a one-sided analogue of the…
Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…
We study Pareto optimality in a decentralized peer-to-peer risk-sharing market where agents' preferences are represented by robust distortion risk measures that are not necessarily convex. We obtain a characterization of Pareto-optimal…
This paper develops a framework for repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived hospitals match with a new generation of short-lived residents in every period. I show…
In many empirical studies of a large two-sided matching market (such as in a college admissions problem), the researcher performs statistical inference under the assumption that they observe a random sample from a large matching market. In…
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…
This paper studies the optimal clearing problem for prosumers in peer-to-peer (P2P) energy markets. It is proved that if no trade weights are enforced and the communication structure between successfully traded peers is connected, then the…
Many online platforms of today, including social media sites, are two-sided markets bridging content creators and users. Most of the existing literature on platform recommendation algorithms largely focuses on user preferences and…
In the Gale-Shapley model of two-sided matching, it is well known that for generic preferences, the outcomes for each side can vary dramatically in the male-optimal vs. female-optimal stable matchings. In this paper, we show that under a…
This paper investigates the determination of feasible input-output pairings for the decentralized integral controllability of non-square systems. The relevance of this problem extends beyond traditional industrial processes into modern AI…
We argue that recent developments in proof-of-work consensus mechanisms can be used in accordance with advancements in formal verification techniques to build a distributed payment protocol that addresses important economic drawbacks from…
We consider a many-to-one matching market where colleges share true preferences over students but make decisions using only independent noisy rankings. Each student has a true value $v$, but each college $c$ ranks the student according to…
This paper investigates the decentralized stabilization problem for a class of interconnected systems in the presence of non-triangular structural uncertainties and time-varying parameters, where each subsystem exchanges information only…