We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings. We prove that this trade-off between a ``thicker'' market and faster matching vanishes in large markets; A greedy policy leads to shorter waiting times, and more agents matched than any other policy. We empirically confirm these findings in data from the National Kidney Registry. Greedy matching achieves as many transplants as commonly-used policies (1.6\% more than monthly-batching), and shorter patient waiting times.
@article{arxiv.1809.06824,
title = {Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets},
author = {Itai Ashlagi and Afshin Nikzad and Philipp Strack},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.06824},
year = {2019}
}