Related papers: Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets

In this paper, we study a matching market model on a bipartite network where agents on each side arrive and depart stochastically by a Poisson process. For such a dynamic model, we design a mechanism that decides not only which agents to…

We study dynamic matching in an infinite-horizon stochastic market. While all agents are potentially compatible with each other, some are hard-to-match and others are easy-to-match. Agents prefer to be matched as soon as possible and…

Kidney transplants are sharply overdemanded in the United States. A recent innovation to address organ shortages is a kidney exchange, in which willing but medically incompatible patient-donor pairs swap donors so that two successful…

We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…

We study the problem of dynamic matching in heterogeneous networks, where agents are subject to compatibility restrictions and stochastic arrival and departure times. In particular, we consider networks with one type of easy-to-match agents…

Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…

We study a foundational model of dynamic matching market with abandonment. This model has been studied by Collina et al (2020) and Aouad and Saritac (2022), and many other papers have considered special cases. We compare the performance of…

In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…

Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design…

An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…

Current kidney exchange pools are of moderate size and thin, as they consist of many highly sensitized patients. Creating a thicker pool can be done by waiting for many pairs to arrive. We analyze a simple class of matching algorithms that…

We study a dynamic matching setting where homogeneous agents arrive at random according to a Poisson process and randomly form edges yielding a sparse market. Agents stay in the market according to a certain sojourn time and wait to be…

We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…

A kidney exchange program, also called a kidney paired donation program, can be viewed as a repeated, dynamic trading and allocation mechanism. This suggests that a dynamic algorithm for transplant exchange selection may have superior…

This paper develops a framework for repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived hospitals match with a new generation of short-lived residents in every period. I show…

In barter exchanges, participants swap goods with one another without exchanging money; exchanges are often facilitated by a central clearinghouse, with the goal of maximizing the aggregate quality (or number) of swaps. Barter exchanges are…

In Kidney Exchange Programs (KEPs), each participating patient is registered together with an incompatible donor. Donors without an incompatible patient can also register. Then, KEPs typically maximize overall patient benefit through donor…

Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…

Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…

Kidney exchanges are organized markets where patients swap willing but incompatible donors. In the last decade, kidney exchanges grew from small and regional to large and national---and soon, international. This growth results in more lives…