Related papers: Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets
Balancing fairness and efficiency in resource allocation is a classical economic and computational problem. The price of fairness measures the worst-case loss of economic efficiency when using an inefficient but fair allocation rule; for…
In barter exchanges agents enter seeking to swap their items for other items on their wishlist. We consider a centralized barter exchange with a set of agents and items where each item has a positive value. The goal is to compute a…
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive…
Each year, thousands of patients in need of heart transplants face life-threatening wait times due to organ scarcity. While allocation policies aim to maximize population-level outcomes, current approaches often fail to account for the…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
A breakthrough of Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno [AKL17] found that imbalance in the number of agents on either side of a random matching market has a profound effect on the market's expected characteristics. Specifically, across all stable…
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with strategic agents. As achieving the full GFT is generally impossible, much of the…
We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player --- who is associated with a subset of vertices --- matches as many of…
We study data exchange among strategic agents without monetary transfers, motivated by domains such as research consortia and healthcare collaborations where payments are infeasible or restricted. The central challenge is to reap the…
A dynamical model of capital exchange is introduced in which a specified amount of capital is exchanged between two individuals when they meet. The resulting time dependent wealth distributions are determined for a variety of exchange…
In the query-commit problem we are given a graph where edges have distinct probabilities of existing. It is possible to query the edges of the graph, and if the queried edge exists then its endpoints are irrevocably matched. The goal is to…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
We perform an experimental study of algorithms for online bipartite matching under the known i.i.d. input model with integral types. In the last decade, there has been substantial effort in designing complex algorithms with the goal of…
In this paper we consider the pairwise kidney exchange game. This game naturally appears in situations that some service providers benefit from pairwise allocations on a network, such as the kidney exchanges between hospitals. Ashlagi et…
The efficient and fair allocation of limited resources is a classical problem in economics and computer science. In kidney exchanges, a central market maker allocates living kidney donors to patients in need of an organ. Patients and donors…
We study mechanisms that use greedy allocation rules and pay-your-bid pricing to allocate resources subject to a matroid constraint. We show that all such mechanisms obtain a constant fraction of the optimal welfare at any equilibrium of…
Active learning is increasingly adopted for expensive multi-objective combinatorial optimization problems, but it involves a challenging subset selection problem, optimizing the batch acquisition score that quantifies the goodness of a…
AI algorithms increasingly make decisions that impact entire groups of humans. Since humans tend to hold varying and even conflicting preferences, AI algorithms responsible for making decisions on behalf of such groups encounter the problem…
The kidney paired donation (KPD) program provides an innovative solution to overcome incompatibility challenges in kidney transplants by matching incompatible donor-patient pairs and facilitating kidney exchanges. To address unequal access…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…