Related papers: Majority voting is not good for heaven or hell, wi…
There is a paradox in the model of social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment (the ViSE model) called "pit of losses." It consists in the fact that a series of democratic decisions may systematically lead the society…
In this paper, we study the efficiency of egoistic and altruistic strategies within the model of social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment (the ViSE model) using two criteria: maximizing the average capital increment…
Within the framework of the ViSE (Voting in a Stochastic Environment) model, we examine the dynamics in a society, part of which can be considered an elite. The model allows us to analyze the influence of social attitudes, such as…
Within the ViSE (Voting in Stochastic Environment) model, we study social dynamics determined by collective decisions in a society with an elite. The model allows the analysis of the influence of participants' social attitudes, such as the…
Within the model of social dynamics determined by collective decisions in a stochastic environment (the ViSE model), we consider the case of a homogeneous society consisting of classically rational economic agents. We obtain analytical…
We revisit the recent breakthrough result of Gkatzelis et al. on (single-winner) metric voting, which showed that the optimal distortion of 3 can be achieved by a mechanism called Plurality Matching. The rule picks an arbitrary candidate…
Within the model of social dynamics determined by collective decisions in a stochastic environment (ViSE model), we consider the case of a homogeneous society consisting of classically rational economic agents (or homines economici, or…
Social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment is analyzed for a society composed of two cohesive groups of similar size. Within the model of random walks determined by voting, explicit formulas are derived for the capital…
A key promise of democratic voting is that, by accounting for all constituents' preferences, it produces decisions that benefit the constituency overall. It is alarming, then, that all deterministic voting rules have unbounded distortion:…
The well-known Condorcet Jury Theorem states that, under majority rule, the better of two alternatives is chosen with probability approaching one as the population grows. We study an asymmetric setting where voters face varying…
Decision-making societies may vary in their level of cooperation and degree of conservatism, both of which influence their overall performance. Moreover, these factors are not fixed -- they can change based on the decisions agents in the…
In many collective decision making situations, agents vote to choose an alternative that best represents the preferences of the group. Agents may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their…
The dynamics of opinion formation in a society is a complex phenomenon where many variables play an important role. Recently, the influence of algorithms to filter which content is fed to social networks users has come under scrutiny.…
Wisdom of the crowd revealed a striking fact that the majority answer from a crowd is often more accurate than any individual expert. We observed the same story in machine learning--ensemble methods leverage this idea to combine multiple…
Epistemic social choice aims at unveiling a hidden ground truth given votes, which are interpreted as noisy signals about it. We consider here a simple setting where votes consist of approval ballots: each voter approves a set of…
Politics around the world exhibits increasing polarization, demonstrated in part by rigid voting configurations in institutions like legislatures or courts. A crux of polarization is separation along a unidimensional ideological axis, but…
Majority voting is one of the few black-box interventions that can improve a fixed stochastic predictor: repeated access can be cheaper than changing a high-capability model. Classical fixed-competence theory makes this intervention look…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
In the context of computational social choice, we study voting methods that assign a set of winners to each profile of voter preferences. A voting method satisfies the property of positive involvement (PI) if for any election in which a…
We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities…