Related papers: Stable matchings with correlated Preferences
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
We consider the stability of matchings when individuals strategically submit preference information to a publicly known algorithm. Most pure Nash equilibria of the ensuing game yield a matching that is unstable with respect to the…
In the well-studied Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of agents into pairs, where no two agents prefer each other over their assigned partners. However, some instances of this problem are unsolvable, lacking any stable…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
We present a model that investigates preference evolution with endogenous matching. In the short run, individuals' subjective preferences influence partner selection and behavior in strategic interactions, which affect their material…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…
We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An $(a,b)$-supermatch is a stable matching in which if $a$ pairs break up it is possible to find another stable…
Given $n$ men, $n$ women, and $n$ dogs, each man has an incomplete preference list of women, each woman does an incomplete preference list of dogs, and each dog does an incomplete preference list of men. We understand a family as a triple…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popular matching is said to be robust if it is popular among…
This paper aims to provide insight into stability of collaboration choices in P2P networks. We study networks where exchanges between nodes are driven by the desire to receive the best service available. This is the case for most existing…
We extend the general stochastic matching model on graphs introduced in (Mairesse and Moyal, 2016), to matching models on multigraphs, that is, graphs with self-loops. The evolution of the model can be described by a discrete time Markov…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
The resident matching algorithm, Gale-Shapley, currently used by SF Match and the National Residency Match Program (NRMP), has been in use for over 50 years without fundamental alteration. The algorithm is a 'stable-marriage' method that…
In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually accepted agents. If any…
We consider stable and popular matching problems in arbitrary graphs, which are referred to as stable roommates instances. We extend the 3/2-approximation algorithm for the maximum size weakly stable matching problem to the roommates case,…
We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the…
A probabilistic approach to the stable matching problem has been identified as an important research area with several important open problems. When considering random matchings, ex-post stability is a fundamental stability concept. A…
Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik,…
Using the recently developed notion of permutation limits this paper derives the limiting distribution of the number of fixed points and cycle structure for any convergent sequence of random permutations, under mild regularity conditions.…