Related papers: Stable matchings with correlated Preferences
I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
In this paper, we demonstrate that in many NP-complete variants of the stable matching problem, such as the Stable Hypergraph Matching problem, the Stable Multicommodity Flow problem, and the College Admission problem with common quotas, a…
The popular matching problem is of matching a set of applicants to a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list, ranking a non-empty subset of posts in the order of preference, possibly with ties. A matching M is popular if…
We give some explicit calculations for stable distributions and convergence to them, mainly based on less explicit results in Feller (1971). The main purpose is to provide ourselves with easy reference to explicit formulas and examples.…
We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching…
In the stable marriage problem (SM), a mechanism that always outputs a stable matching is called a stable mechanism. One of the well-known stable mechanisms is the man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm (MGS). MGS has a good property that it…
We propose and investigate a model for mate searching and marriage in large societies based on a stochastic matching process and simple decision rules. Agents have preferences among themselves given by some probability distribution. They…
In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However,…
This expository article presents an overview of research, conducted mostly between the mid-1990s and late 2000s, that explores a link between commutation relations among a family of asymptotically stable vector fields and stability…
The Stable Marriage Problem (SMP) has been extremely discussed in the literature and it is useful to a number of real-world applications. We propose a generalized version of the SMP in which numbers of the matching groups are different as…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a…
Mechanisms leading to speciation are a major focus in evolutionary biology. In this paper, we present and study a stochastic model of population where individuals, with type a or A, are equivalent from ecological, demographical and spatial…
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…
Given a natural number N, one may ask what configuration of N points on the two-sphere minimizes the discrete generalized Coulomb energy. If one applies a gradient-based numerical optimization to this problem, one encounters many…
We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give…
The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…