Related papers: Non-Excludable Bilateral Trade Between Groups

In markets where algorithmic data processing is increasingly prevalent, recommendation algorithms can substantially affect trade and welfare. We consider a setting in which an algorithm recommends a product based on its value to the buyer…

A multiproduct seller is more informed than consumers about the value of her products to consumers. The seller posts a price list and segments the market through cheap-talk communication. We find that when both seller's and consumers'…

We consider the problem of maximizing revenue when selling 2 items to a single buyer with known valuation distributions. Hart and Nisan showed that selling each item separately using the optimal Myerson's price, gains at least half of the…

Strategic information is valuable either by remaining private (for instance if it is sensitive) or, on the other hand, by being used publicly to increase some utility. These two objectives are antagonistic and leaking this information might…

We show that computing the revenue-optimal deterministic auction in unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian settings, i.e. the optimal item-pricing, is computationally hard even in single-item settings where the buyer's value distribution is a…

We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…

A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…

Selling a perfectly divisible item to potential buyers is a fundamental task with apparent applications to pricing communication bandwidth and cloud computing services. Surprisingly, despite the rich literature on single-item auctions,…

Within a general semimartingale framework, we study the relationship between collective market efficiency and individual rationality. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (possibly zero-sum) exchanges among…

We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism…

We initiate the study of single-sample bilateral trade with a broker, drawing an analogy to the setting of single-sample bilateral trade without a broker considered in Babaioff et al. (2020) and Cai and Wu (2023). Our model captures the…

We prove the existence of an equilibrium in a model with transaction costs and price impact where two agents are incentivized to trade towards a target. The two types of frictions -- price impact and transaction costs -- lead the agents to…

We introduce a two-agent problem which is inspired by price asymmetry arising from funding difference. When two parties have different funding rates, the two parties deduce different fair prices for derivative contracts even under the same…

We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…

In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and…

Social exclusion has been regarded as one of the most effective measures to promote the evolution of cooperation. In real society, the way in which social exclusion works can be direct or indirect. However, thus far there is no related work…

We consider a one-period Kyle (1985) framework where the insider can be subject to a penalty if she trades. We establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for virtually any penalty function when noise is uniform. In equilibrium, the…

We study arbitrage opportunities, market viability and utility maximization in market models with an insider. Assuming that an economic agent possesses from the beginning an additional information in the form of a random variable G, which…

Motivated by the emergence of popular service-based two-sided markets where sellers can serve multiple buyers at the same time, we formulate and study the {\em two-sided cost sharing} problem. In two-sided cost sharing, sellers incur…

We study the power of item-pricing as a tool for approximately optimizing social welfare in a combinatorial market. We consider markets with $m$ indivisible items and $n$ buyers. The goal is to set prices to the items so that, when agents…