Related papers: Non-Excludable Bilateral Trade Between Groups

This paper studies arbitrage pricing theory in financial markets with implicit transaction costs. We extend the existing theory to include the more realistic possibility that the price at which the investors trade is dependent on the traded…

We study a bilateral trade problem where a principal has private information that is revealed with delay, such as a seller who does not yet know her production cost. Postponing the contracting process incurs a costly delay, while early…

We consider the problem of a single seller repeatedly selling a single item to a single buyer (specifically, the buyer has a value drawn fresh from known distribution $D$ in every round). Prior work assumes that the buyer is fully rational…

I consider an environment in which a decision maker faces uncertainty and privately holds information in the form of a signal about the true state of the world. The decision maker purchases additional information from a data broker before…

Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex offering many different bundles to the buyer that could even be randomized. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps between randomized and deterministic mechanisms, or…

We consider an auction of identical digital goods to customers whose valuations are drawn independently from known distributions. Myerson's classic result identifies the truthful mechanism that maximizes the seller's expected profit. Under…

A special case of Myerson's classic result describes the revenue-optimal equilibrium when a seller offers a single item to a buyer. We study a repeated sales extension of this model: a seller offers to sell a single fresh copy of an item to…

We present a novel bilateral negotiation model that allows a self-interested agent to learn how to negotiate over multiple issues in the presence of user preference uncertainty. The model relies upon interpretable strategy templates…

No trade theorems examine conditions under which agents cannot agree to disagree on the value of a security which pays according to some state of nature, thus preventing any mutual agreement to trade. A large literature has examined…

Recommender systems play an increasingly crucial role in shaping people's opportunities, particularly in online dating platforms. It is essential from the user's perspective to increase the probability of matching with a suitable partner…

Maximizing the revenue from selling _more than one_ good (or item) to a single buyer is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show that simple "one-dimensional" mechanisms, such as…

This paper deals with two-sided matching market with two disjoint sets, i.e. the set of buyers and the set of sellers. Each seller can trade with at most with one buyer and vice versa. Money is transferred from sellers to buyers for an…

Social goods are goods that grant value not only to their owners but also to the owners' surroundings, be it their families, friends or office mates. The benefit a non-owner derives from the good is affected by many factors, including the…

We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider…

This paper shows that a well designed transport system has an embedded exchange value by serving as a market for potential exchange between consumers. Under suitable conditions, one can improve the welfare of consumers in the system simply…

We study the problem of online dynamic pricing with two types of fairness constraints: a "procedural fairness" which requires the proposed prices to be equal in expectation among different groups, and a "substantive fairness" which requires…

A trading system is said to be {robust} if it generates a robust return regardless of market direction. To this end, a consistently positive expected trading gain is often used as a robustness metric for a trading system. In this paper, we…

I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monopolistic seller and the buyer each observes a private signal…

We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our…

An expert seller chooses an experiment to influence a client's purchasing decision, but may manipulate the experiment result for personal gain. When credibility surpasses a critical threshold, the expert chooses a fully-revealing experiment…