Related papers: Non-Excludable Bilateral Trade Between Groups
Traders buy and sell financial instruments in hopes of making profit, and brokers are responsible for the transaction. There are several hypotheses and conspiracy theories arguing that in some situations, brokers want their traders to lose…
We show that, with indivisible goods, the existence of competitive equilibrium fundamentally depends on agents' substitution effects, not their income effects. Our Equilibrium Existence Duality allows us to transport results on the…
Identical products being sold at different prices in different locations is a common phenomenon. Price differences might occur due to various reasons such as shipping costs, trade restrictions and price discrimination. To model such…
This paper studies convex duality in optimal investment and contingent claim valuation in markets where traded assets may be subject to nonlinear trading costs and portfolio constraints. Under fairly general conditions, the dual expressions…
This paper reexamines the classic problem of revenue maximization in single-item auctions with $n$ buyers under the lens of the robust optimization framework. The celebrated Myerson's mechanism is the format that maximizes the seller's…
We study the design of prior-independent auctions in a setting with heterogeneous bidders. In particular, we consider the setting of selling to $n$ bidders whose values are drawn from $n$ independent but not necessarily identical…
Separate selling of two independent goods is shown to yield at least 62% of the optimal revenue, and at least 73% when the goods satisfy the Myerson regularity condition. This improves the 50% result of Hart and Nisan (2017, originally…
A recent line of research has established a novel desideratum for designing approximately-revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, namely the buy-many constraint. Under this constraint, prices for different allocations made by the mechanism…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
We consider the problem of maximizing portfolio value when an agent has a subjective view on asset value which differs from the traded market price. The agent's trades will have a price impact which affect the price at which the asset is…
The enhanced competition paradigm is an attempt at bridging the gap between simple and optimal auctions. In this line of work, given an auction setting with $m$ items and $n$ bidders, the goal is to find the smallest $n' \geq n$ such that…
In a recent publication, using a simple two-period model, which is already capable to capture essential non-convex multiperiod bids, Richstein et al. have shown that in the case of optimal bidding, multi-part bidding always ensures a higher…
We consider the problem of regulating products with negative externalities to a third party that is neither the buyer nor the seller, but where both the buyer and seller can take steps to mitigate the externality. The motivating example to…
During the last decades two important contributions have reshaped our understanding of international trade. First, countries trade more with those with whom they share history, language, and culture, suggesting that trade is limited by…
A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's private type and also an unknown state of nature. An…
We develop a cross-border market model for two countries based on a continuous trading mechanism, in which the transmission capacities that enable transactions between market participants from different countries are limited. Our market…
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a…
We propose a novel family of sales-based rebate mechanisms that induce network effects in sales of products that do not exhibit such externalities. The proposed rebate mechanisms enable the seller of a product with uncertain quality to…
A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism in…
Online auctions are one of the most fundamental facets of the modern economy and power an industry generating hundreds of billions of dollars a year in revenue. Auction theory has historically focused on the question of designing the best…