Related papers: The Complexity of Optimizing Atomic Congestion
This paper deals with the complexity of the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for discrete preference games and network coordination games beyond $O(\log n)$-treewidth and tree metric spaces. First, we estimate the number of…
Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games…
We study an extensive class of movement minimization problems which arise from many practical scenarios but so far have little theoretical study. In general, these problems involve planning the coordinated motion of a collection of agents…
We study a novel control problem in the context of network coordination games: the individuation of the smallest set of players capable of driving the system, globally, from one Nash equilibrium to another one. Our main contribution is the…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
We examine the routing problem for self-interested vehicles using stochastic decision strategies. By approximating the road latency functions and a non-linear variable transformation, we frame the problem as an aggregative game. We…
The additively separable hedonic game (ASHG) is a model of coalition formation games on graphs. In this paper, we intensively and extensively investigate the computational complexity of finding several desirable solutions, such as a Nash…
An universal primal-dual approach of description equilibriums in large class of hierarchical congestion population games is proposed. At the very core of the approach is hierarchy of enclosed to each other transport networks. In different…
In this work, we consider the problem of autonomous racing with multiple agents where agents must interact closely and influence each other to compete. We model interactions among agents through a game-theoretical framework and propose an…
Many distributed optimization algorithms achieve existentially-optimal running times, meaning that there exists some pathological worst-case topology on which no algorithm can do better. Still, most networks of interest allow for…
We consider clustering games in which the players are embedded in a network and want to coordinate (or anti-coordinate) their strategy with their neighbors. The goal of a player is to choose a strategy that maximizes her utility given the…
Popular myths that cheaper memory, high-speed links and high-speed processors will solve the problem of congestion in computer networks are shown to be false. A simple definition for congestion based on supply and demand of resources is…
In order to coordinate players in a game must first identify a target pattern of behaviour. In this paper we investigate the difficulty of identifying prominent outcomes in two kinds of binary action coordination problems in social…
We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.…
Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…
We perform a refined complexity-theoretic analysis of three classical problems in the context of Hierarchical Task Network Planning: the verification of a provided plan, whether an executable plan exists, and whether a given state can be…
The optimal offloading of tasks in heterogeneous edge-computing scenarios is of great practical interest, both in the selfish and fully cooperative setting. In practice, such systems are typically very large, rendering exact solutions in…
In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design…
We study the equilibrium computation problem for two classical resource allocation games: atomic splittable congestion games and multimarket Cournot oligopolies. For atomic splittable congestion games with singleton strategies and…
Congestion game is a widely used model for modern networked applications. A central issue in such applications is that the selfish behavior of the participants may result in resource overloading and negative externalities for the system…