Related papers: Revealing Sequential Rationality and Forward Induc…

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide…

Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…

Something is definitely wrong. If the game has a linear winning strategy, then it is tractable. What's going on? Well, we describe a two-person game which has a definite winner, that is, a player who can force a win in a finite number of…

In the optional prisoner's dilemma (OPD), players can choose to cooperate and defect as usual, but can also abstain as a third possible strategy. This strategy models the players' participation in the game and is a relevant aspect in many…

We investigate an algorithm that assigns to any game in normal form an approximating game that admits an ordinal potential function. Due to the properties of potential games, the algorithm equips every game with a surrogate reward structure…

We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…

Human cooperation depends on how accurately we infer others' motives--how much they value fairness, generosity, or self-interest from the choices they make. We model that process in binary dictator games, which isolate moral trade-offs…

The principle of open determinacy for class games---two-player games of perfect information with plays of length $\omega$, where the moves are chosen from a possibly proper class, such as games on the ordinals---is not provable in…

We prove the dynamic programming principe for uniformly nondegenerate stochastic differential games in the framework of time-homogeneous diffusion processes considered up to the first exit time from a domain. The zeroth-order "coefficient"…

Games offer a compelling paradigm for developing general reasoning capabilities in language models, as they naturally demand strategic planning, probabilistic inference, and adaptive decision-making. However, existing self-play approaches…

We analyze Coquand's game-theoretic interpretation of Peano Arithmetic through the lens of elementary descent recursion. In Coquand's game semantics, winning strategies correspond to infinitary cut-free proofs and cut elimination…

We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding…

Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by…

Bayesian inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) methods are ideal for safe imitation learning, as they allow a learning agent to reason about reward uncertainty and the safety of a learned policy. However, Bayesian IRL is computationally…

We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly…

Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…

Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…

Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We…

We extend the study of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) from Nash strategic games to a class of qualitative games. Also in this case, the IESDS process leads us to a kind of 'rationalizable' result. We…

Discovering and exploiting the causal structure in the environment is a crucial challenge for intelligent agents. Here we explore whether causal reasoning can emerge via meta-reinforcement learning. We train a recurrent network with…