Related papers: Popularity on the 3D-Euclidean Stable Roommates
Intransitivity is a critical issue in pairwise preference modeling. It refers to the intransitive pairwise preferences between a group of players or objects that potentially form a cyclic preference chain and has been long discussed in…
Popularity is an approach in mechanism design to find fair structures in a graph, based on the votes of the nodes. Popular matchings are the relaxation of stable matchings: given a graph G=(V,E) with strict preferences on the neighbors of…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
Motivated by real-world applications such as the allocation of public housing, we examine the problem of assigning a group of agents to vertices (e.g., spatial locations) of a network so that the diversity level is maximized. Specifically,…
The stable roommates problem does not necessarily have a solution, i.e. a stable matching. We had found that, for the uniformly random instance, the expected number of solutions converges to $e^{1/2}$ as $n$, the number of members, grows,…
The Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) is among the most famous NP-hard optimization problems. We design for this problem a randomized polynomial-time algorithm that computes a (1+eps)-approximation to the optimal tour, for any fixed eps>0,…
Divide and Conquer is a well known algorithmic procedure for solving many kinds of problem. In this procedure, the problem is partitioned into two parts until the problem is trivially solvable. Finding the distance of the closest pair is an…
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…
The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…
We consider coalition formation games in which each player has preferences over the other players and his preferences over coalitions are based on the best player ($\mathcal{B}$-/B-hedonic games) or the worst player ($\mathcal{W}$/W-hedonic…
We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G=(A\cup B,E)$ where nodes in $A$ are agents having preferences in partial order over their neighbors, while nodes in $B$ are objects without preferences. We propose a polynomial-time…
Schelling games model the wide-spread phenomenon of residential segregation in metropolitan areas from a game-theoretic point of view. In these games agents of different types each strategically select a node on a given graph that models…
We study single-candidate voting embedded in a metric space, where both voters and candidates are points in the space, and the distances between voters and candidates specify the voters' preferences over candidates. In the voting, each…
Consensus halving refers to the problem of dividing a resource into two parts so that every agent values both parts equally. Prior work has shown that when the resource is represented by an interval, a consensus halving with at most $n$…
We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have…
In this paper we revisit the classical method of partitioning classification and study its convergence rate under relaxed conditions, both for observable (non-privatised) and for privatised data. We consider the problem of classification in…
Consider a set $P$ of $n$ points picked uniformly and independently from $[0,1]^d$ for a constant dimension $d$ -- such a point set is extremely well behaved in many aspects. For example, for a fixed $r \in [0,1]$, we prove a new…
We continue and extend previous work on the parameterized complexity analysis of the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists problem, thereby strengthening earlier results both on the side of parameterized hardness as well…
In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…