Related papers: The Use of Symmetry for Models with Variable-size …
In this paper we consider symmetric games where a large number of players can be in any one of d states. We derive a limiting mean field model and characterize its main properties. This mean field limit is a system of coupled ordinary…
What does it mean to fully understand the behavior of a network of adaptive agents? The golden standard typically is the behavior of learning dynamics in potential games, where many evolutionary dynamics, e.g., replicator, are known to…
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium for imperfect-information extensive-form games (EFGs) that enforces consistency between the two components of a solution: agents' strategy profile describing their…
This paper considers the noncooperative maximization of mutual information in the Gaussian interference channel in a fully distributed fashion via game theory. This problem has been studied in a number of papers during the past decade for…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
We consider the basic problem of approximating Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. For monotone games, we design continuous time flows which converge in an averaged sense to Nash equilibria. We also study mean field equilibria, which…
Normal-form proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson as a refinement of normal-form perfect equilibrium, occupies a distinctive position in the equilibrium analysis of extensive-form games because its more stringent perturbation structure…
In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…
A classic model to study strategic decision making in multi-agent systems is the normal-form game. This model can be generalised to allow for an infinite number of pure strategies leading to continuous games. Multi-objective normal-form…
Game Theory studies situations in which multiple agents having conflicting objectives have to reach a collective decision. The question of a compact representation language for agents utility function is of crucial importance since the…
Game theory is used by all behavioral sciences, but its development has long centered around tools for relatively simple games and toy systems, such as the economic interpretation of equilibrium outcomes. Our contribution, compositional…
Aligning large language models (LLMs) to serve users with heterogeneous and potentially conflicting preferences is a central challenge for personalized and trustworthy AI. We formalize an ideal notion of universal alignment through…
We study so-called invariant games played with a fixed number $d$ of heaps of matches. A game is described by a finite list $\mathcal{M}$ of integer vectors of length $d$ specifying the legal moves. A move consists in changing the current…
This paper deals with different concepts for characterizing the size of mathematical objects. A game theoretic investigation and generalization of two size concepts, which can both be formulated in topological terms, is provided: the so…
We study discrete-time, finite-state mean-field games (MFGs) under model uncertainty, where agents face ambiguity about the state transition probabilities. Each agent maximizes its expected payoff against the worst-case transitions within…
A variety of problems in econometrics and machine learning, including instrumental variable regression and Bellman residual minimization, can be formulated as satisfying a set of conditional moment restrictions (CMR). We derive a general,…
We extend anytime constraints to the Markov game setting and the corresponding solution concept of an anytime-constrained equilibrium (ACE). Then, we present a comprehensive theory of anytime-constrained equilibria that includes (1) a…
We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…
The bisimulation metric (BSM) is a powerful tool for computing state similarities within a Markov decision process (MDP), revealing that states closer in BSM have more similar optimal value functions. While BSM has been successfully…