Related papers: The Use of Symmetry for Models with Variable-size …
Value methods for solving stochastic games with partial observability model the uncertainty about states of the game as a probability distribution over possible states. The dimension of this belief space is the number of states. For many…
In this paper, we consider both finite and infinite horizon discounted dynamic mean-field games where there is a large population of homogeneous players sequentially making strategic decisions and each player is affected by other players…
This paper considers two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. The study focuses on the challenging settings where the value function or the model is parameterized by general function classes. Provably…
In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a…
The Nash equilibrium is an important benchmark for behaviour in systems of strategic autonomous agents. Polymatrix games are a succinct and expressive representation of multiplayer games that model pairwise interactions between players. The…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
We introduce a new simple game, which is referred to as the complementary weighted multiple majority game (C-WMMG for short). C-WMMG models a basic cooperation rule, the complementary cooperation rule, and can be taken as a sister model of…
A set of many identical interacting agents obeying a global additive constraint is considered. Under the hypothesis of equiprobability in the high-dimensional volume delimited in phase space by the constraint, the statistical behavior of a…
Game comonads, introduced by Abramsky, Dawar and Wang, and developed by Abramsky and Shah, give a categorical semantics for model comparison games. We present an axiomatic account of Feferman-Vaught-Mostowski (FVM) composition theorems…
This paper studies the finite-time horizon Markov games where the agents' dynamics are decoupled but the rewards can possibly be coupled across agents. The policy class is restricted to local policies where agents make decisions using their…
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-based learning (namely, perturbed learning automata) and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in repeatedly-played, positive-utility, finite strategic-form games. Prior work in this class of…
In game theory, players have continuous expected payoff functions and can use fixed point theorems to locate equilibria. This optimization method requires that players adopt a particular type of probability measure space. Here, we introduce…
We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…
Mean field games (MFGs) offer a powerful framework for modeling large-scale multi-agent systems. This paper addresses MFGs formulated in continuous time with discrete state spaces, where agents' dynamics are governed by continuous-time…
Here, we consider one-dimensional forward-forward mean-field games (MFGs) with congestion, which were introduced to approximate stationary MFGs. We use methods from the theory of conservation laws to examine the qualitative properties of…
In this paper we survey various notions of anonymity and symmetry for finite strategic-form games present in relevant literature, and discuss notions of fairness; show that game bijections and game isomorphisms form groupoids; introduce…
We consider $N$-player games, in continuous time, finite state space and finite time horizon, on a geometrical structure possessing a macroscopic limit in a suitable sense. This geometrical structure breaks the permutation invariance…
Wide machine learning tasks can be formulated as non-convex multi-player games, where Nash equilibrium (NE) is an acceptable solution to all players, since no one can benefit from changing its strategy unilaterally. Attributed to the…
We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…
According to Shapley's game-theoretical result, there exists a unique game value of finite cooperative games that satisfies axioms on additivity, efficiency, null-player property and symmetry. The original setting requires symmetry with…