Related papers: Strategic Waiting in Centralized Matching: Daycare…
In centralized assignment problems, agents may have preferences over joint rather than individual assignments, such as couples in residency matching or siblings in school choice and daycare. Standard preference estimation methods typically…
In the medical residency matching markets of the U.S. and Japan, we observe that an applicant's probability of matching with their first-listed program is disproportionately higher than that of matching with their second-listed program,…
We study the outcome of deferred acceptance when prospective medical residents can only apply to a limited set of hospitals. This limitation requires residents to make a strategic choice about the quality of hospitals they apply to. Through…
Caseworkers in foster care systems match waiting children to adoptive homes. We use dynamic matching market design to characterize a class of mechanisms that incentivize expedient matches that homes can accept or decline. We design…
In this paper, we study a daycare matching problem in Japan and report the design and implementation of a new centralized algorithm, which is going to be deployed in one municipality in the Tokyo metropolis. There are two features that make…
We study a dynamic matching problem on a two-sided platform with unbalanced patience, in which long-lived supply accumulates over time with a unit waiting cost per period, while short-lived demand departs if not matched promptly. High- or…
Strategic classification studies the design of a classifier robust to the manipulation of input by strategic individuals. However, the existing literature does not consider the effect of competition among individuals as induced by the…
We study a practical centralized matching problem which assigns children to daycare centers. The collective preferences of siblings from the same family introduce complementarities, which can lead to the absence of stable matchings, as…
The matching literature often recommends market centralization under the assumption that agents know their own preferences and that their preferences are fixed. We find counterevidence to this assumption in a quasi-experiment. In Germany's…
We introduce a constrained priority mechanism that combines outcome-based matching from machine-learning with preference-based allocation schemes common in market design. Using real-world data, we illustrate how our mechanism could be…
Incomplete take-up of welfare benefits remains a major policy puzzle. This paper decomposes the causes of incomplete welfare take-up into two mechanisms: inattention, where households do not consider program participation, and active…
Algorithmic predictions are increasingly informing societal resource allocations by identifying individuals for targeting. Policymakers often build these systems with the assumption that by gathering more observations on individuals, they…
This paper studies a decentralized many-to-one matching market where preferences remain uncertain during the matching process. Institutions initiate matching by sending offers, and applicants decide whether to accept upon receiving them.…
We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matching problems when agents have unrestricted cardinal preferences over a finite set of items. Random priority is a very well-known…
An increasing number of applications require to recognize the class of an incoming time series as quickly as possible without unduly compromising the accuracy of the prediction. In this paper, we put forward a new optimization criterion…
In real-world settings of the Deferred Acceptance stable matching algorithm, such as the American medical residency match (NRMP), school choice programs, and various national university entrance systems, candidates need to decide which…
We study a practical two-sided matching problem of allocating children to daycare centers, which has significant social implications. We are cooperating with several municipalities in Japan and our goal is to devise a reliable and…
Information frictions can harm the welfare of participants in two-sided matching markets. Consider a centralized admission, where colleges cannot observe students' preparedness for success in a particular major or degree program. Colleges…
We present a new framework for designing nonpreemptive and job-size oblivious scheduling policies in the multiserver-job queueing model. The main requirement is to identify a static and balanced sub-partition of the server set and ensure…
We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line segment [0,1] and have approval preferences over two…