Related papers: Strategic Waiting in Centralized Matching: Daycare…
To better understand discriminations and the effect of affirmative actions in selection problems (e.g., college admission or hiring), a recent line of research proposed a model based on differential variance. This model assumes that the…
Healthcare programs such as Medicaid provide crucial services to vulnerable populations, but due to limited resources, many of the individuals who need these services the most languish on waiting lists. Survival models, e.g. the Cox…
The Deferred Acceptance algorithm is a popular school allocation mechanism thanks to its strategy proofness. However, with application costs, strategy proofness fails, leading to an identification problem. In this paper, I address this…
Fair division is typically framed from a centralized perspective. However, in practice resource allocation often occurs via decentralized networks. We study a decentralized variant of fair division inspired by altruistic dynamics observed…
Oversubscribed treatments are often allocated using randomized waiting lists. Applicants are ranked randomly, and treatment offers are made following that ranking until all seats are filled. To estimate causal effects, researchers often…
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects…
We study the problem of learning, from observational data, fair and interpretable policies that effectively match heterogeneous individuals to scarce resources of different types. We model this problem as a multi-class multi-server queuing…
A growing number of authorities use mechanisms to allocate students to schools in a way that reflects student preferences and school priorities. However, most real-world mechanisms incentivize students to strategically misreport their…
This paper proposes a novel school choice system where schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within it without…
In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We…
Advance reservation is important to guarantee the quality of services of jobs by allowing exclusive access to resources over a defined time interval on resources. It is a challenge for the scheduler to organize available resources…
Diagnostic clinics are among healthcare facilities that suffer from long waiting times which can cause medical issues and lead to increases in patient no-shows. Reducing waiting times without significant capital investments is a challenging…
We introduce the problem of assigning resources to improve their utilization. The motivation comes from settings where agents have uncertainty about their own values for using a resource, and where it is in the interest of a group that…
Matching markets are often organized in a multi-stage and decentralized manner. Moreover, participants in real-world matching markets often have uncertain preferences. This article develops a framework for learning optimal strategies in…
In several socioeconomic-critical decision-making settings, such as fair resource allocation, climate policy, or AI alignment, multiple principals interact within a common arena. While it is well established that these principals may have…
We study the problem of an organization that matches agents to objects where agents have preference rankings over objects and the organization uses algorithms to construct a ranking over objects on behalf of each agent. Our new framework…
Public and private institutions must often allocate scare resources under uncertainty. Banks, for example, extend credit to loan applicants based in part on their estimated likelihood of repaying a loan. But when the quality of information…
We investigate computational and mechanism design aspects of scarce resource allocation, where the primary rationing mechanism is through waiting times. Specifically we consider allocating medical treatments to a population of patients.…
Using school choice as a motivating example, we introduce a stylized model of a many-to-one matching market where the clearinghouse aims to implement contingent priorities, i.e., priorities that depend on the current assignment, to…
Mandatory waiting periods have been instituted for medical procedures, gun purchases, and other high-stakes decisions. Are these softly paternalistic policies substitutes for harder restrictions, and are delayed decisions more respected? In…