Paternalism and Deliberation: An Experiment on Making Formal Rules
Abstract
Mandatory waiting periods have been instituted for medical procedures, gun purchases, and other high-stakes decisions. Are these softly paternalistic policies substitutes for harder restrictions, and are delayed decisions more respected? In a general population survey experiment, Choice Architects make rules for decision-makers facing a high-stakes Bomb Risk Elicitation Task. Treatments vary when the decision is made: on the spot or after one day, and whether the initial decision can be revised. Choice Architects set a cap on the decision-maker's risk taking; in one treatment, they can additionally implement a mandatory waiting period. Exogenous deliberation has no effect on the cap; equivalence testing (TOST) and Bayesian analysis () provide strong positive evidence for the absence of an effect. Endogenously prescribed waiting periods are add-on restrictions that do not substitute for the cap. Choice Architects believe that, with time, the average decision-maker will take less risk and -- because of the distribution of Choice Architects' bliss points -- come closer to Choice Architects' subjective ideal choice; the resulting reduction in forecasted errors is small. Soft and hard paternalistic instruments are not substitutes: waiting periods are deployed as add-on restrictions.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2501.00863,
title = {Paternalism and Deliberation: An Experiment on Making Formal Rules},
author = {Max R. P. Grossmann},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.00863},
year = {2026}
}