Related papers: Common Knowledge, Regained
We consider the common-knowledge paradox raised by Halpern and Moses: common knowledge is necessary for agreement and coordination, but common knowledge is unattainable in the real world because of temporal imprecision. We discuss two…
Common knowledge is crucial for safe group coordination. In its absence, humans must rely on shared knowledge, which is inherently limited in depth and therefore prone to coordination failures, because any finite-order knowledge attribution…
According to Aumann's celebrated theorem, rational agents cannot agree to disagree. In other words, agents who once shared a common prior probability distribution and who have common knowledge about their posteriors cannot assign different…
Coordinating activities at different sites of a multi-agent system typically imposes epistemic constraints on the participants. Specifying explicit bounds on the relative times at which actions are performed induces combined temporal and…
We consider two simple variants of a framework for reasoning about knowledge amongst communicating groups of players. Our goal is to clarify the resulting epistemic issues. In particular, we investigate what is the impact of common…
In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has…
Common Knowledge Logic is meant to describe situations of the real world where a group of agents is involved. These agents share knowledge and make strong statements on the knowledge of the other agents (the so called \emph{common…
Aumann's famous Agreeing to Disagree Theorem states that if a group of agents share a common prior, update their beliefs by Bayesian conditioning based on private information, and have common knowledge of their posterior beliefs regarding…
A celebrated 1976 theorem of Aumann asserts that honest, rational Bayesian agents with common priors will never "agree to disagree": if their opinions about any topic are common knowledge, then those opinions must be equal. Economists have…
This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private information game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent's prior expectations are heterogenous, it derives a sharp condition for the…
We revisit a recent puzzle about common knowledge, the ``sailboat" case (Lederman, 2018), and argue that Lewisian common knowledge allows us to reconcile the pre-theoretical intuition that certain facts are ``public" in such situations,…
Through set-theoretic formalization of the notion of common knowledge, Aumann proved that if two agents have the common priors, and their posteriors for a given event are common knowledge, then their posteriors must be equal. In this paper…
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations…
Moses & Nachum ([7]) identify conceptual flaws in Bacharach's generalization ([3]) of Aumann's seminal "agreeing to disagree" result ([1]). Essentially, Bacharach's framework requires agents' decision functions to be defined over events…
Common knowledge of intentions is crucial to basic social tasks ranging from cooperative hunting to oligopoly collusion, riots, revolutions, and the evolution of social norms and human culture. Yet little is known about how common knowledge…
This paper presents experiments on common knowledge logic, conducted with the help of the proof assistant Coq. The main feature of common knowledge logic is the eponymous modality that says that a group of agents shares a knowledge about a…
When we enumerate numbers up to some specific value, or, even if we do not specify the number, we know at the same time that there are much greater numbers which should be reachable by the same enumeration, but indeed we also congnize them…
This paper studies incomplete-information games in which an information provider, an oracle, publicly discloses information to the players. One oracle is said to dominate another if, in every game, it can replicate the equilibrium outcomes…
Reasoning about knowledge seems to play a fundamental role in distributed systems. Indeed, such reasoning is a central part of the informal intuitive arguments used in the design of distributed protocols. Communication in a distributed…
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are…