Comparison of Oracles
Theoretical Economics
2026-05-19 v5
Abstract
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Distinct characterizations are provided for deterministic and stochastic signaling functions, based on simultaneous posterior matching, partition refinements, and common knowledge components. This study extends the work of Blackwell (1951) to games, and expands the study of Aumann (1976) on common knowledge, along with the companion Part II, which develops a theory of information loops.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2505.15955,
title = {Comparison of Oracles},
author = {David Lagziel and Ehud Lehrer and Tao Wang},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.15955},
year = {2026}
}