Related papers: Envy-Free Cake-Cutting for Four Agents

We consider a classical envy-free cake cutting problem. The first limited protocol was proposed by Aziz and McKenzie in 2016 arXiv:1604.03655. The disadvantage of this protocol is its high complexity. The authors proved that the maximum…

We study a fair division problem in (multi)graphs where $n$ agents (vertices) are pairwise connected by items (edges), and each agent is only interested in its incident items. We consider how to allocate items to incident agents in an…

We introduce a graphical framework for fair division in cake cutting, where comparisons between agents are limited by an underlying network structure. We generalize the classical fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality to this…

We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of heterogeneous divisible resources among agents with different preferences. We focus on the setting where the resources correspond to the edges of a connected graph, every agent must be…

In the classic problem of fair cake-cutting, a single interval ("cake") has to be divided among n agents with different value measures, giving each agent a single sub-interval with a value of at least 1/n of the total. This paper studies a…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items and a desirable heterogeneous divisible good (i.e., cake) to agents with additive utilities. In our paper, each indivisible item can be a good that yields non-negative utilities to…

Classic cake-cutting algorithms enable people with different preferences to divide among them a heterogeneous resource (``cake''), such that the resulting division is fair according to each agent's individual preferences. However, these…

Fair division has emerged as a very hot topic in multiagent systems, and envy-freeness is among the most compelling fairness concepts. An allocation of indivisible items to agents is envy-free if no agent prefers the bundle of any other…

We study the query complexity of cake cutting and give lower and upper bounds for computing approximately envy-free, perfect, and equitable allocations with the minimum number of cuts. The lower bounds are tight for computing connected…

We consider the fair division problem of indivisible items. It is well-known that an envy-free allocation may not exist, and a relaxed version of envy-freeness, envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), has been widely considered. In an EF1…

We study the discrete variation of the classical cake-cutting problem where n players divide a 1-dimensional cake with exactly (n-1) cuts, replacing the continuous, infinitely divisible "cake" with a necklace of discrete, indivisible…

Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental settings in fair division and mechanism design without money. In this paper, we consider different levels of three fundamental goals in cake cutting: fairness, Pareto optimality, and…

Relying on configuration spaces and equivariant topology, we study a general "cooperative envy-free division problem". A group of players want to cut a "cake" $I=[0,1]$ and divide among themselves the pieces in an envy-free manner. Once the…

Finding an envy-free allocation of indivisible resources to agents is a central task in many multiagent systems. Often, non-trivial envy-free allocations do not exist, and, when they do, finding them can be computationally hard. Classical…

We consider multi-layered cake cutting in order to fairly allocate numerous divisible resources (layers of cake) among a group of agents under two constraints: contiguity and feasibility. We first introduce a new computational model in a…

This paper extends the classic cake-cutting problem to a situation in which the "cake" is divided among families. Each piece of cake is owned and used simultaneously by all members of the family. A typical example of such a cake is land. We…

We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying…

This work develops algorithmic results for the classic cake-cutting problem in which a divisible, heterogeneous resource (modeled as a cake) needs to be partitioned among agents with distinct preferences. We focus on a standard formulation…

This paper studies fair division of divisible and indivisible items among agents whose cardinal preferences are not necessarily monotone. We establish the existence of fair divisions and develop approximation algorithms to compute them. We…

We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in previous works,…