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Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…
We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated,…
This paper presents a new framework for analyzing and designing no-regret algorithms for dynamic (possibly adversarial) systems. The proposed framework generalizes the popular online convex optimization framework and extends it to its…
A celebrated result in the interface of online learning and game theory guarantees that the repeated interaction of no-regret players leads to a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) -- a natural game-theoretic solution concept. Despite the…
Understanding the behavior of no-regret dynamics in general $N$-player games is a fundamental question in online learning and game theory. A folk result in the field states that, in finite games, the empirical frequency of play under…
Regret has been established as a foundational concept in online learning, and likewise has important applications in the analysis of learning dynamics in games. Regret quantifies the difference between a learner's performance against a…
We study the problem of dynamic regret minimization in online convex optimization, in which the objective is to minimize the difference between the cumulative loss of an algorithm and that of an arbitrary sequence of comparators. While the…
This paper addresses the problem of designing efficient no-swap regret algorithms for combinatorial bandits, where the number of actions $N$ is exponentially large in the dimensionality of the problem. In this setting, designing efficient…
In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…
We consider a linear stochastic bandit problem involving $M$ agents that can collaborate via a central server to minimize regret. A fraction $\alpha$ of these agents are adversarial and can act arbitrarily, leading to the following tension:…
We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to…
Large language models (LLMs) have been increasingly employed for (interactive) decision-making, via the development of LLM-based autonomous agents. Despite their emerging successes, the performance of LLM agents in decision-making has not…
In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…
Regret matching (RM) -- and its modern variants -- is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games, such as poker. Yet, surprisingly little is known so far in…
No-regret learning has a long history of being closely connected to game theory. Recent works have devised uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that, when adopted by all the players in normal-form games, converge to various equilibrium…
We provide a novel reduction from swap-regret minimization to external-regret minimization, which improves upon the classical reductions of Blum-Mansour [BM07] and Stolz-Lugosi [SL05] in that it does not require finiteness of the space of…
We investigate the interplay between passivity, no-regret, and convergence in contractive games for various learning dynamic models and their higher-order variants. Our setting is continuous time. Building on prior work for replicator…
In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some notion of equilibria of the stage game. Our primary focus is on…
The problem of regret minimization for online adaptive control of linear-quadratic systems is studied. In this problem, the true system transition parameters (matrices $A$ and $B$) are unknown, and the objective is to design and analyze…
It is a well-known fact that correlated equilibria can be computed in polynomial time in a large class of concisely represented games using the celebrated Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008; Jiang and…