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We study episodic reinforcement learning under unknown adversarial corruptions in both the rewards and the transition probabilities of the underlying system. We propose new algorithms which, compared to the existing results in (Lykouris et…
In the context of multi-player, general-sum games, there is an increasing interest in solution concepts modeling some form of communication among players, since they can lead to socially better outcomes with respect to Nash equilibria, and…
Learning and equilibrium computation in games are fundamental problems across computer science and economics, with applications ranging from politics to machine learning. Much of the work in this area revolves around a simple algorithm…
Counterfactual regret minimization is a family of algorithms of no-regret learning dynamics capable of solving large-scale imperfect information games. We propose implementing this algorithm as a series of dense and sparse matrix and vector…
We study a collaborative multi-agent stochastic linear bandit setting, where $N$ agents that form a network communicate locally to minimize their overall regret. In this setting, each agent has its own linear bandit problem (its own reward…
This paper addresses the distributed online control problem over a network of linear time-invariant (LTI) systems (with possibly unknown dynamics) in the presence of adversarial perturbations. There exists a global network cost that is…
We consider distributed linear bandits where $M$ agents learn collaboratively to minimize the overall cumulative regret incurred by all agents. Information exchange is facilitated by a central server, and both the uplink and downlink…
We consider regret minimization in low-rank MDPs with fixed transition and adversarial losses. Previous work has investigated this problem under either full-information loss feedback with unknown transitions (Zhao et al., 2024), or bandit…
We study fast rates of convergence in the setting of nonparametric online regression, namely where regret is defined with respect to an arbitrary function class which has bounded complexity. Our contributions are two-fold: - In the…
We consider regret minimization in repeated games with non-convex loss functions. Minimizing the standard notion of regret is computationally intractable. Thus, we define a natural notion of regret which permits efficient optimization and…
We study the constrained reinforcement learning problem, in which an agent aims to maximize the expected cumulative reward subject to a constraint on the expected total value of a utility function. In contrast to existing model-based…
We study repeated two-player games where one of the players, the learner, employs a no-regret learning strategy, while the other, the optimizer, is a rational utility maximizer. We consider general Bayesian games, where the payoffs of both…
We introduce Cautious Optimism, a framework for substantially faster regularized learning in general games. Cautious Optimism, as a variant of Optimism, adaptively controls the learning pace in a dynamic, non-monotone manner to accelerate…
We propose the first regret-based approach to the Graphical Bilinear Bandits problem, where $n$ agents in a graph play a stochastic bilinear bandit game with each of their neighbors. This setting reveals a combinatorial NP-hard problem that…
Online learning algorithms for dynamical systems provide finite time guarantees for control in the presence of sequentially revealed cost functions. We pose the classical linear quadratic tracking problem in the framework of online…
Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is not known by other agents, nor is it known by the mechanism…
Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many…
We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…
The problem of matching markets has been studied for a long time in the literature due to its wide range of applications. Finding a stable matching is a common equilibrium objective in this problem. Since market participants are usually…
We study the problem of making predictions of an adversarially chosen high-dimensional state that are unbiased subject to an arbitrary collection of conditioning events, with the goal of tailoring these events to downstream decision makers.…