Related papers: CryptoVerif: a Computationally-Sound Security Prot…
Consider the problem of verifying security properties of a cryptographic protocol coded in C. We propose an automatic solution that needs neither a pre-existing protocol description nor manual annotation of source code. First, symbolically…
This thesis presents an automated method for verifying security properties of protocol implementations written in the C language. We assume that each successful run of a protocol follows the same path through the C code, justified by the…
Current formal verification of security protocols relies on specialized researchers and complex tools, inaccessible to protocol designers who informally evaluate their work with emulators. This paper addresses this gap by embedding symbolic…
In this paper we propose a general definition of secrecy for cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao model. We give a sufficient condition ensuring secrecy for protocols where rules have encryption depth at most two, that is satisfied by…
Cryptographic primitives are fundamental for information security: they are used as basic components for cryptographic protocols or public-key cryptosystems. In many cases, their security proofs consist in showing that they are reducible to…
A cryptographic protocol (CP) is a distributed algorithm designed to provide a secure communication in an insecure environment. CPs are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, database access systems, etc.…
We propose a security verification framework for cryptographic protocols using machine learning. In recent years, as cryptographic protocols have become more complex, research on automatic verification techniques has been focused on. The…
Cryptographic protocols are hard to design and prove correct, as witnessed by the ever-growing list of attacks even on protocol standards. Symbolic models of cryptography enable automated formal security proofs of such protocols against an…
We present the Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF) for developing and checking complete proofs of security for cryptographic schemes within a proof assistant. This is a general-purpose framework that is capable of modeling and…
Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the…
Cryptographic Protocols (CP) are distributed algorithms intended for secure communication in an insecure environment. They are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, systems of confidential data processing,…
When large AI models are deployed as cloud-based services, clients have no guarantee that responses are correct or were produced by the intended model. Rerunning inference locally is infeasible for large models, and existing cryptographic…
MTProto 2.0 is a suite of cryptographic protocols for instant messaging at the core of the popular Telegram messenger application. In this paper we analyse MTProto 2.0 using the symbolic verifier ProVerif. We provide fully automated proofs…
With today's quantum processors venturing into regimes beyond the capabilities of classical devices [1-3], we face the challenge to verify that these devices perform as intended, even when we cannot check their results on classical…
We give a new theoretical solution to a leading-edge experimental challenge, namely to the verification of quantum computations in the regime of high computational complexity. Our results are given in the language of quantum interactive…
Automatically analyzing information flow within Android applications that rely on cryptographic operations with their computational security guarantees imposes formidable challenges that existing approaches for understanding an app's…
Transparency protocols are protocols whose actions can be publicly monitored by observers (such observers may include regulators, rights advocacy groups, or the general public). The observed actions are typically usages of private keys such…
Formal verification is a critical process in ensuring the security and correctness of cryptographic protocols, particularly in high-assurance domains. This paper presents a comprehensive formal analysis of the Permission Voucher Protocol, a…
Security of cryptographic protocols can be analysed by creating a model in a formal language and verifying the model in a tool. All such tools focus on the last part of the analysis, verification, and the interpretation of the specification…
In the absence of any efficient classical schemes for verifying a universal quantum computer, the importance of limiting the required quantum resources for this task has been highlighted recently. Currently, most of efficient quantum…