Related papers: CryptoVerif: a Computationally-Sound Security Prot…
Automated verification of security protocols based on dynamic root of trust, typically relying on protected hardware such as TPM, involves several challenges that we address in this paper. We model the semantics of trusted computing…
Classical symbolic protocol verification under Dolev--Yao uses binary attacker knowledge (known/unknown). This abstraction misses cumulative side-channel settings, where repeated noisy observations progressively improve attacker knowledge.…
Current formal approaches have been successfully used to find design flaws in many security protocols. However, it is still challenging to automatically analyze protocols due to their large or infinite state spaces. In this paper, we…
Recent progress towards theoretical interpretability guarantees for AI has been made with classifiers that are based on interactive proof systems. A prover selects a certificate from the datapoint and sends it to a verifier who decides the…
We give an AM protocol that allows the verifier to sample elements x from a probability distribution P, which is held by the prover. If the prover is honest, the verifier outputs (x, P(x)) with probability close to P(x). In case the prover…
In this paper, we extend the protocol of classical verification of quantum computations (CVQC) recently proposed by Mahadev to make the verification efficient. Our result is obtained in the following three steps: $\bullet$ We show that…
A computationally secure noised based cipher system is proposed. The advantage of this cipher system is that it operates above noise level. Therefore computationally secure communication can be done when error correction code fails. Another…
We describe how to verify security properties of C code for cryptographic protocols by using a general-purpose verifier. We prove security theorems in the symbolic model of cryptography. Our techniques include: use of ghost state to attach…
Logics for security protocol analysis require the formalization of an adversary model that specifies the capabilities of adversaries. A common model is the Dolev-Yao model, which considers only adversaries that can compose and replay…
The classical channel remote state preparation (ccRSP) is an important two-party primitive in quantum cryptography. Alice (classical polynomial-time) and Bob (quantum polynomial-time) exchange polynomial rounds of classical messages, and…
We present two protocols for classical verification of quantum depth. Our protocols allow a purely classical verifier to distinguish devices with different quantum circuit depths even in the presence of classical computation. We show that a…
It is of folkloric belief that the security of classical cryptographic protocols is automatically broken if the Adversary is allowed to perform superposition queries and the honest players forced to perform actions coherently on quantum…
A proof of quantumness (PoQ) allows a classical verifier to efficiently test if a quantum machine is performing a computation that is infeasible for any classical machine. In this work, we propose a new approach for constructing PoQ…
Security is critical for everything relying on modern digital systems. Because almost all digital interactions are governed by the Internet and cryptographic protocols, these protocols must serve as reliable mechanisms that guarantee core…
Protocol narrations are widely used in security as semi-formal notations to specify conversations between roles. We define a translation from a protocol narration to the sequences of operations to be performed by each role. Unlike previous…
Computational security in cryptography has a risk that computational assumptions underlying the security are broken in the future. One solution is to construct information-theoretically-secure protocols, but many cryptographic primitives…
In this note, we observe that quantum logspace computations are verifiable by classical logspace algorithms, with unconditional security. More precisely, every language in BQL has an (information-theoretically secure) streaming proof with a…
This paper presents a complete formal specification, protocol description, and mathematical proof structure for Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) as originally defined in the Bitcoin whitepaper \cite{nakamoto2008}. In stark contrast to…
We define a problem of certifying computation integrity performed by some remote party we do not necessarily trust. We present a multi-party interactive protocol called SafeComp that solves this problem under specified constraints.…
Cryptographic protocols are the backbone of our information society. This includes two-party protocols which offer protection against distrustful players. Such protocols can be built from a basic primitive called oblivious transfer. We…