Related papers: CryptoVerif: a Computationally-Sound Security Prot…
The implementation of security protocols often combines different languages. This practice, however, poses a challenge to traditional verification techniques, which typically assume a single-language environment and, therefore, are…
Several of the basic cryptographic constructs have associated algebraic structures. Formal models proposed by Dolev and Yao to study the (unconditional) security of public key protocols form a group. The security of some types of protocols…
In recent years, many researches have been done to establish symbolic models of stateful protocols. Two works among them, the SAPIC tool and StatVerif tool, provide a high-level specification language and an automated analysis. Their…
The present paper introduces a practical protocol for provably secure, outsourced computation. Our protocol minimizes overhead for verification by requiring solutions to withstand an interactive game between a prover and challenger. For…
Recently, interest has been emerging in the application of symbolic techniques to the specification and analysis of cryptosystems. These techniques, when accompanied by suitable proofs of soundness/completeness, can be used both to identify…
Computer-aided analysis of security protocols heavily relies on equational theories to model cryptographic primitives. Most automated verifiers for security protocols focus on equational theories that satisfy the Finite Variant Property…
Although good encryption functions are probabilistic, most symbolic models do not capture this aspect explicitly. A typical solution, recently used to prove the soundness of such models with respect to computational ones, is to explicitly…
In the secure two-party computation problem, two parties wish to compute a (possibly randomized) function of their inputs via an interactive protocol, while ensuring that neither party learns more than what can be inferred from only their…
With experimental quantum computing technologies now in their infancy, the search for efficient means of testing the correctness of these quantum computations is becoming more pressing. An approach to the verification of quantum computation…
Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-state systems. Proofs are generated using…
Based on our previous work on truly concurrent process algebras APTC, we use it to verify the security protocols. This work (called Secure APTC, abbreviated SAPTC) have the following advantages in verifying security protocols: (1) It has a…
We introduce CryptoBap, a platform to verify weak secrecy and authentication for the (ARMv8 and RISC-V) machine code of cryptographic protocols. We achieve this by first transpiling the binary of protocols into an intermediate…
As mobile devices pervade physical space, the familiar authentication patterns are becoming insufficient: besides entity authentication, many applications require, e.g., location authentication. Many interesting protocols have been proposed…
We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…
This work initiates an analysis of several cryptographic protocols from a rational point of view using a game-theoretical approach, which allows us to represent not only the protocols but also possible misbehaviours of parties. Concretely,…
Verifiable credentials are a digital analogue of physical credentials. Their authenticity and integrity are protected by means of cryptographic techniques, and they can be presented to verifiers to reveal attributes or even predicates about…
This paper deals with distributed matrix multiplication. Each player owns only one row of both matrices and wishes to learn about one distinct row of the product matrix, without revealing its input to the other players. We first improve on…
Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive which performs encryption and signature in a single logical step. In conventional signcryption only receiver of the signcrypted text can verify the authenticity of the origin i.e. signature of the…
We present the first protocol allowing a classical computer to interactively verify the result of an efficient quantum computation. We achieve this by constructing a measurement protocol, which enables a classical verifier to use a quantum…
When computation is outsourced, the data owner would like to be assured that the desired computation has been performed correctly by the service provider. In theory, proof systems can give the necessary assurance, but prior work is not…