Related papers: One n Remains to Settle the Tree Conjecture
We study Nash equilibria in the network creation game of Fabrikant et al.[10]. In this game a vertex can buy an edge to another vertex for a cost of $\alpha$, and the objective of each vertex is to minimize the sum of the costs of the edges…
We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classical model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant et al. In this model every agent (node) buys links at a prefixed price $\alpha>0$ in order to get connected to the…
Selfish Network Creation focuses on modeling real world networks from a game-theoretic point of view. One of the classic models by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] is the network creation game, where agents correspond to nodes in a network which…
In the network creation game with n vertices, every vertex (a player) buys a set of adjacent edges, each at a fixed amount {\alpha} > 0. It has been conjectured that for {\alpha} >= n, every Nash equilibrium is a tree, and has been…
We study the Nash equilibrium and the price of anarchy in the max-distance network creation game. Network creation game, first introduced and studied by Fabrikant et al., is a classic model for real-world networks from a game-theoretic…
We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classic model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant et al. In this model every agent (node) buys links at a prefixed price $\alpha > 0$ in order to get connected to the…
We consider a network creation game in which each player (vertex) has a fixed budget to establish links to other players. In our model, each link has unit price and each agent tries to minimize its cost, which is either its local diameter…
The Internet has emerged as perhaps the most important network in modern computing, but rather miraculously, it was created through the individual actions of a multitude of agents rather than by a central planning authority. This motivates…
We study strong equilibria in network creation games. These form a classical and well-studied class of games where a set of players form a network by buying edges to their neighbors at a cost of a fixed parameter $\alpha$. The cost of a…
How do rational agents self-organize when trying to connect to a common target? We study this question with a simple tree formation game which is related to the well-known fair single-source connection game by Anshelevich et al. (FOCS'04)…
We study the sum classic network creation game introduced by Fabrikant et al. in which $n$ players conform a network buying links at individual price $\alpha$. When studying this model we are mostly interested in \emph{Nash equilibria}…
We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classic model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou and Shenker in 2003. This is a selfish network creation model where players correspond…
The triangle game introduced by Chv\'{a}tal and Erd\H{o}s (1978) is one of the most famous combinatorial games. For $n,q\in\mathbb{N}$, the $(n,q)$-triangle game is played by two players, called Maker and Breaker, on the complete graph…
We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their…
Network creation games are well-established for investigating the decentralized formation of communication networks, like the Internet or social networks. In these games, selfish agents that correspond to network nodes strategically create…
An $\alpha$-thin tree $T$ of a graph $G$ is a spanning tree such that every cut of $G$ has at most an $\alpha$ proportion of its edges in $T$. The Thin Tree Conjecture proposes that there exists a function $f$ such that for any $\alpha >…
In the swap game (SG) selfish players, each of which is associated to a vertex, form a graph by edge swaps, i.e., a player changes its strategy by simultaneously removing an adjacent edge and forming a new edge (Alon et al., 2013). The cost…
A class of graphs is bridge-addable if given a graph $G$ in the class, any graph obtained by adding an edge between two connected components of $G$ is also in the class. We prove a conjecture of McDiarmid, Steger, and Welsh, that says that…
We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of selfish network creation by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03]. GE are interesting for two reasons: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations…
The arboricity $\Gamma(G)$ of an undirected graph $G = (V,E)$ is the minimal number such that $E$ can be partitioned into $\Gamma(G)$ forests. Nash-Williams' formula states that $k = \lceil \gamma(G) \rceil$, where $\gamma(G)$ is the…