Related papers: Finite-horizon Approximations and Episodic Equilib…
Zero-sum stochastic games are easy to solve as they can be cast as simple Markov decision processes. This is however not the case with general-sum stochastic games. A fairly general optimization problem formulation is available for…
We study the infinite horizon discrete time N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game ($N \geq 2$) with stopping times as strategies (or pure strategies). We prove existence of an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium point for the game by presenting a…
We consider a general formulation of the random horizon Principal-Agent problem with a continuous payment and a lump-sum payment at termination. In the European version of the problem, the random horizon is chosen solely by the principal…
In this paper, we present a method for finding approximate Nash equilibria in a broad class of reachability games. These games are often used to formulate both collision avoidance and goal satisfaction. Our method is computationally…
In this paper, we study finite-agent linear-quadratic games on graphs. Specifically, we propose a comprehensive framework that extends the existing literature by incorporating heterogeneous and interpretable player interactions. Compared to…
This paper considers the discounted criterion of nonzero-sum decentralized stochastic games with prospect players. The state and action spaces are finite. The state transition probability is nonstationary. Each player independently controls…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
This paper considers the efficient exact computation of the counterpart of the Gittins index for a finite-horizon discrete-state bandit, which measures for each initial state the average productivity, given by the maximum ratio of expected…
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…
In this paper, we introduce discrete-time linear mean-field games subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of a generic agent is a compact Borel space. At every time, each agent is randomly…
Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards.…
This work develops an approximation procedure for a class of non-zero-sum stochastic differential investment and reinsurance games between two insurance companies. Both proportional reinsurance and excess-of loss reinsurance policies are…
The recent mean field game (MFG) formalism facilitates otherwise intractable computation of approximate Nash equilibria in many-agent settings. In this paper, we consider discrete-time finite MFGs subject to finite-horizon objectives. We…
We study two-player zero-sum concurrent stochastic games with finite state and action space played for an infinite number of steps. In every step, the two players simultaneously and independently choose an action. Given the current state…
We consider a finite horizon repeated game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. In each period,…
Constrained Markov Decision Processes (CMDPs) formalize sequential decision-making problems whose objective is to minimize a cost function while satisfying constraints on various cost functions. In this paper, we consider the setting of…
This paper uses recent results on continuous-time finite-horizon optimal switching problems with negative switching costs to prove the existence of a saddle point in an optimal stopping (Dynkin) game. Sufficient conditions for the game's…
In this paper we study a discrete-time semidiscretization and a fully discretization (discrete-time, discrete-state) of an infinite time horizon noncooperative $N$-player differential game. We prove that as either the discretization time…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
In this paper, we solve the problem of learning a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in merely monotone games. First, we propose a novel continuous semi-decentralized solution algorithm without projections that uses first-order information…