Related papers: Solving Two-Player General-Sum Games Between Swarm…
H{\infty} control of nonlinear continuous-time system depends on the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation, which has been proved impossible to obtain a closed-form solution due to the nonlinearity of HJI equation. In order…
We study computationally efficient methods for finding equilibria in n-player general-sum games, specifically ones that afford complex visuomotor skills. We show how existing methods would struggle in this setting, either computationally or…
We consider a class of two-player dynamic stochastic nonzero-sum games where the state transition and observation equations are linear, and the primitive random variables are Gaussian. Each controller acquires possibly different dynamic…
This paper is an exposition of algorithms for finding one or all equilibria of a bimatrix game (a two-player game in strategic form) in the style of a chapter in a graduate textbook. Using labeled "best-response polytopes", we present the…
Hamilton-Jacobi partial differential equations (HJ PDEs) have deep connections with a wide range of fields, including optimal control, differential games, and imaging sciences. By considering the time variable to be a higher dimensional…
We train two neural networks adversarially to play static games. At each iteration, a row and column network observe a new random bimatrix game and output individual mixed strategies. The parameters of each network are independently updated…
We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with both players adopting impulse controls, on a finite time horizon. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) partial differential equation of the game turns out to be a…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…
We use a simple N-player stochastic game with idiosyncratic and common noises to introduce the concept of Master Equation originally proposed by Lions in his lectures at the Coll\`ege de France. Controlling the limit N tends to the infinity…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning has made substantial empirical progresses in solving games with a large number of players. However, theoretically, the best known sample complexity for finding a Nash equilibrium in general-sum games…
In swarm robotics, confrontation including the pursuit-evasion game is a key scenario. High uncertainty caused by unknown opponents' strategies, dynamic obstacles, and insufficient training complicates the action space into a hybrid…
Artificial intelligence and robotic competitions are accompanied by a class of game paradigms in which each player privately commits a strategy to a game system which simulates the game using the collected joint strategy and then returns…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in large population games. Agents from multiple populations select strategies for repeated interactions with one another. At each stage of these interactions, agents use their decision-making model to…
We consider the problem of finding stationary Nash equilibria (NE) in a finite discounted general-sum stochastic game. We first generalize a non-linear optimization problem from Filar and Vrieze [2004] to a $N$-player setting and break down…
Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…
This paper presents a general mean-field game (GMFG) framework for simultaneous learning and decision-making in stochastic games with a large population. It first establishes the existence of a unique Nash Equilibrium to this GMFG, and…
We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to…
We study Nash equilibria learning of a general-sum stochastic game with an unknown transition probability density function. Agents take actions at the current environment state and their joint action influences the transition of the…
In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…