Related papers: Information design in Bayesian routing games
The ranking and selection problem is a popular framework in the simulation literature for studying optimal information collection. We study a version of this problem in which the simulation output for each design is normally distributed…
The Braess paradox describes the counterintuitive situation that the addition of new roads to road networks can lead to higher travel times for all network users. Recently we could show that user optima leading to the paradox exist in…
Consider planning a trip in a train network. In contrast to, say, a road network, the edges are temporal, i.e., they are only available at certain times. Another important difficulty is that trains, unfortunately, sometimes get delayed.…
Optimizing passengers routes is crucial to design efficient transportation networks. Recent results show that optimal transport provides an efficient alternative to standard optimization methods. However, it is not yet clear if this…
We investigate the optimal design of networks for a general transport system. Our network is built from a regular two-dimensional ($d=2$) square lattice to be improved by adding long-range connections (shortcuts) with probability $P_{ij}…
A decision maker typically (i) incorporates training data to learn about the relative effectiveness of treatments, and (ii) chooses an implementation mechanism that implies an ``optimal'' predicted outcome distribution according to some…
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…
We study a Bayesian persuasion problem with externalities. In this model, a principal sends signals to inform multiple agents about the state of the world. Simultaneously, due to the existence of externalities in the agents' utilities, the…
We consider a platform facilitating trade between sellers and buyers with the objective of maximizing consumer surplus. Even though in many such marketplaces prices are set by revenue-maximizing sellers, platforms can influence prices…
In a typical model of private information and choice under uncertainty, a decision maker observes a signal, updates her prior beliefs using Bayes rule, and maximizes her expected utility. If the decision maker's utility function satisfies…
It is common in recommendation systems that users both consume and produce information as they make strategic choices under uncertainty. While a social planner would balance "exploration" and "exploitation" using a multi-armed bandit…
Despite the ubiquity of transportation data, methods to infer the state parameters of a network either ignore sensitivity of route decisions, require route enumeration for parameterizing descriptive models of route selection, or require…
Strategic information design is a framework where a sender designs information strategically to steer its receiver's decision towards a desired choice. Traditionally, such frameworks have always assumed that the sender and the receiver…
This paper investigates the value of recommendations for disseminating economic information, with a focus on frictions resulting from preference heterogeneity. We consider Bayesian expected-payoff maximizers who receive non-strategic…
The optimal selection of experimental conditions is essential to maximizing the value of data for inference and prediction, particularly in situations where experiments are time-consuming and expensive to conduct. We propose a general…
The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature mostly assumes a dichotomy: either the…
This paper studies how a downstream retailer in a decentralized two-tier supply chain can implicitly transmit demand information to an upstream supplier through the structure of its order stream in the absence of an explicit…
A designer relies on an experimenter to provide information to a decision maker, but the experimenter has incentives to persuade rather than merely transmit information. Anticipating this motive, the designer can restrict the set of…
The multiple access scheduling decides how the channel is shared among the nodes in the network. Typical scheduling algorithms aims at increasing the channel utilization and thereby throughput of the network. This paper describes several…
This paper investigates how an autonomous agent can transmit information through its motion in an adversarial setting. We consider scenarios where an agent must reach its goal while deceiving an intelligent observer about its destination.…