Related papers: Information design in Bayesian routing games
We study an information design problem in transportation networks, in the presence of a random state that affects the travel times on the links. An omniscient system planner -- aiming at reducing congestion -- observes the network state…
Traffic navigation services have gained widespread adoption in recent years. The route recommendations generated by these services often leads to severe congestion on urban streets, raising concerns from neighboring residents and city…
We consider a largely untapped potential for the improvement of traffic networks that is rooted in the inherent uncertainty of travel times. Travel times are subject to stochastic uncertainty resulting from various parameters such as…
We consider a routing game among non-atomic agents where link latency functions are conditional on an uncertain state of the network. The agents have the same prior belief about the state, but only a fixed fraction receive private route…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…
In many engineered systems, agents make decisions under incomplete information, creating opportunities for a planner to influence decentralized behavior through signaling. We study how such signaling can be designed in parallel-network,…
In this paper, we explore a scenario where a sender provides an information policy and a receiver, upon observing a realization of this policy, decides whether to take a particular action, such as making a purchase. The sender's objective…
When users lack specific knowledge of various system parameters, their uncertainty may lead them to make undesirable deviations in their decision making. To alleviate this, an informed system operator may elect to signal information to…
This article studies the value of information in route choice decisions when a fraction of players have access to high accuracy information about traffic incidents relative to others. To model such environments, we introduce a Bayesian…
We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous information systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its subscribed…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…
This paper addresses information design in a workhorse model of network games, where agents have linear best responses, the information designer maximizes a quadratic objective, and the payoff-relevant state follows a multivariate Gaussian…
Recent studies on transportation networks have shown that real-time route guidance can inadvertently induce congestion or oscillatory traffic patterns. Nevertheless, such technologies also offer a promising opportunity to manage traffic…
Boundedly Rational User Equilibria (BRUE) capture situations where all agents on a transportation network are electing the fastest option up to some time indifference, and serve as a relaxation of User Equilibria (UE), where each agent…
Classical deterministic optimal control problems assume full information about the controlled process. The theory of control for general partially-observable processes is powerful, but the methods are computationally expensive and typically…
We study the problem of information provision by a strategic central planner who can publicly signal about an uncertain infectious risk parameter. Signalling leads to an updated public belief over the parameter, and agents then make…
Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing…
We study information design settings where the designer controls information about a state, and there are multiple agents interacting in a game who are privately informed about their types. Each agent's utility depends on all agents' types…