Related papers: Information design in Bayesian routing games
The travel costs of the players (travelers) in anonymous congestion games depend on their choices of routes and also on the states of the transportation network such as incidents, weather, and road work. In this extended abstract, we…
We consider a model of Bayesian observational learning in which a sequence of agents receives a private signal about an underlying binary state of the world. Each agent makes a decision based on its own signal and its observations of…
In this paper, we investigate the coordination of autonomous devices with non-aligned utility functions. Both encoder and decoder are considered as players, that choose the encoding and the decoding in order to maximize their long-run…
We study the use of Bayesian persuasion (i.e., strategic use of information disclosure/signaling) in endogenous team formation. This is an important consideration in settings such as crowdsourcing competitions, open science challenges and…
This paper considers Bayesian persuasion for routing games where information about the uncertain state of the network is provided by a traffic information system (TIS) using public signals. In this setup, the TIS commits to a signalling…
To what extent can an external observer observing an equilibrium action distribution in an incomplete information game infer the underlying information structure? We investigate this issue in a general linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework. A…
How can a system designer exploit system-level knowledge to derive incentives to optimally influence social behavior? The literature on network routing contains many results studying the application of monetary tolls to influence behavior…
Many biological regulatory systems process signals out of steady state and respond with a physiological delay. A simple model of regulation which respects these features shows how the ability of a delayed output to transmit information is…
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…
A principal designs an algorithm that generates a publicly observable prediction of a binary state. She must decide whether to act directly based on the prediction or to delegate the decision to an agent with private information but…
We study the following repeated non-atomic routing game. In every round, nature chooses a state in an i.i.d. manner according to a publicly known distribution, which influences link latency functions. The system planner makes private route…
We analyze different strategies aimed at optimizing routing policies in the Internet. We first show that for a simple deterministic algorithm the local properties of the network deeply influence the time needed for packet delivery between…
Information-theoretic arguments focus on modeling the reliability of information transmission, assuming availability of infinite data at sources, thus ignoring randomness in message generation times at the respective sources. However, in…
Social-media platforms are one of the most prevalent communication media today. In such systems, a large amount of content is generated and available to the platform. However, not all content can be transmitted to every possible user at all…
In this paper we design information elicitation mechanisms for Bayesian auctions. While in Bayesian mechanism design the distributions of the players' private types are often assumed to be common knowledge, information elicitation considers…
When traffic is routed through a network that is susceptible to congestion, the self-interested decisions made by individual users do not, in general, produce the optimal flow. This discrepancy is quantified by the so-called "price of…
We study the optimal provision of information for two natural performance measures of queuing systems: throughput and makespan. A set of parallel links is equipped with deterministic capacities and stochastic travel times where the latter…
This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…
Autonomous robots are increasingly deployed for information-gathering tasks in environments that vary across space and time. Planning informative and safe trajectories in such settings is challenging because information decays when regions…
An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent…