Related papers: On Incentivizing Social Information Sharing Throug…
In congestion games, users make myopic routing decisions to jam each other, and the social planner with the full information designs mechanisms on information or payment side to regulate. However, it is difficult to obtain time-varying…
In congestion games, selfish users behave myopically to crowd to the shortest paths, and the social planner designs mechanisms to regulate such selfish routing through information or payment incentives. However, such mechanism design…
Today mobile users learn and share their traffic observations via crowdsourcing platforms (e.g., Waze). Yet such platforms simply cater to selfish users' myopic interests to recommend the shortest path, and do not encourage enough users to…
Today mobile users learn and share their traffic observations via crowdsourcing platforms (e.g., Google Maps and Waze). Yet such platforms myopically recommend the currently shortest path to users, and selfish users are unwilling to travel…
Today navigation applications (e.g., Waze and Google Maps) enable human users to learn and share the latest traffic observations, yet such information sharing simply aids selfish users to predict and choose the shortest paths to jam each…
Today mobile users are intensively interconnected thanks to the emerging mobile social networks, where they share location-based information with each other when traveling on different routes and visit different areas of the city. In our…
The congestion pricing is an efficient allocation approach to mediate demand and supply of network resources. Different from the previous pricing using Affine Marginal Cost (AMC), we focus on studying the game between network coding and…
Today mobile users such as drivers are invited by content providers (e.g., Tripadvisor) to sample fresh information of diverse paths to control the age of information (AoI). However, selfish drivers prefer to travel through the shortest…
Among the many functions a Smart City must support, transportation dominates in terms of resource consumption, strain on the environment, and frustration of its citizens. We study transportation networks under two different routing…
Path selection by selfish agents has traditionally been studied by comparing social optima and equilibria in the Wardrop model, i.e., by investigating the Price of Anarchy in selfish routing. In this work, we refine and extend the…
Online content platforms are concerned about the freshness of their content updates to their end customers, and increasingly more platforms now invite and pay the crowd to sample real-time information (e.g., traffic observations and sensor…
The price of anarchy (PoA) has been widely used in static games to quantify the loss of efficiency due to noncooperation. Here, we extend this concept to a general differential games framework. In addition, we introduce the price of…
To ensure that social networks (e.g. opinion consensus, cooperative estimation, distributed learning and adaptation etc.) proliferate and efficiently operate, the participating agents need to collaborate with each other by repeatedly…
The proliferation of smart mobile devices has spurred an explosive growth of mobile crowd-learning services, where service providers rely on the user community to voluntarily collect, report, and share real-time information for a collection…
We investigate traffic routing both from the perspective of theory as well as real world data. First, we introduce a new type of games: $\theta$-free flow games. Here, commuters only consider, in their strategy sets, paths whose free-flow…
Within mobility systems, the presence of self-interested users can lead to aggregate routing patterns that are far from the societal optimum which could be achieved by centrally controlling the users' choices. In this paper, we design a…
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a standard metric for quantifying inefficiency in socio-technical systems, widely used to guide policies like traffic tolling. Conventional PoA analysis relies on exact numerical costs. However, in many…
Incentives are key to the success of crowdsourcing which heavily depends on the level of user participation. This paper designs an incentive mechanism to motivate a heterogeneous crowd of users to actively participate in crowdsourcing…
In this paper, we analyse how a peer-to-peer sharing platform should price its service (when imagined as an excludable public good) to maximize profit, when each user's participation adds value to the platform service by creating a positive…
The price of anarchy (PoA) is a popular metric for analyzing the inefficiency of self-interested decision making. Although its study is widespread, characterizing the PoA can be challenging. A commonly employed approach is based on the…