Related papers: Efficient Last-iterate Convergence Algorithms in S…

We establish finite-time last-iterate guarantees for vanilla stochastic gradient descent in co-coercive games under noisy feedback. This is a broad class of games that is more general than strongly monotone games, allows for multiple Nash…

This paper studies two fundamental problems in regularized Graphon Mean-Field Games (GMFGs). First, we establish the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of any $\lambda$-regularized GMFG (for $\lambda\geq 0$). This result relies on weaker…

Iterative algorithms based on thresholding, feedback and null space tuning (NST+HT+FB) for sparse signal recovery are exceedingly effective and fast, particularly for large scale problems. The core algorithm is shown to converge in finitely…

Empirical risk minimization (ERM) of neural networks is prone to over-reliance on spurious correlations and poor generalization on minority groups. The recent deep feature reweighting (DFR) technique achieves state-of-the-art group…

Different types of dynamics have been studied in repeated game play, and one of them which has received much attention recently consists of those based on "no-regret" algorithms from the area of machine learning. It is known that dynamics…

Nonlinear frequency hopping has emerged as a promising approach for mitigating interference and enhancing range resolution in automotive FMCW radar systems. Achieving an optimal balance between high range-resolution and effective…

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility…

Regret minimization has played a key role in online learning, equilibrium computation in games, and reinforcement learning (RL). In this paper, we describe a general model-free RL method for no-regret learning based on repeated…

This paper studies multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games, with the goal of learning Nash equilibria or coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) sample-optimally. All prior results suffer from at least one of the two obstacles: the…

This paper studies policy optimization algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning. We begin by proposing an algorithm framework for two-player zero-sum Markov Games in the full-information setting, where each iteration consists of a…

This paper examines the long-run behavior of learning with bandit feedback in non-cooperative concave games. The bandit framework accounts for extremely low-information environments where the agents may not even know they are playing a…

Equilibrium computation on Riemannian manifolds provides a unifying framework for numerous problems in machine learning and data analytics. One of the simplest yet most fundamental methods is Riemannian gradient descent (RGD). While its…

Self-play via online learning is one of the premier ways to solve large-scale two-player zero-sum games, both in theory and practice. Particularly popular algorithms include optimistic multiplicative weights update (OMWU) and optimistic…

We consider the use of no-regret algorithms to compute equilibria for particular classes of convex-concave games. While standard regret bounds would lead to convergence rates on the order of $O(T^{-1/2})$, recent work \citep{RS13,SALS15}…

The convergence of online learning algorithms in games under self-play is a fundamental question in game theory and machine learning. Among various notions of convergence, last-iterate convergence is particularly desirable, as it reflects…

We study the problem of no-regret learning algorithms for general monotone and smooth games and their last-iterate convergence properties. Specifically, we investigate the problem under bandit feedback and strongly uncoupled dynamics, which…

We study fast rates of convergence in the setting of nonparametric online regression, namely where regret is defined with respect to an arbitrary function class which has bounded complexity. Our contributions are two-fold: - In the…

Computing approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player general-sum Markov games is a computationally intractable task. However, multi-player Markov games with certain cooperative or competitive structures might circumvent this…

Mean field games (MFGs) tractably model behavior in large agent populations. The literature on learning MFG equilibria typically focuses on finding Nash equilibria (NE), which assume perfectly rational agents and are hence implausible in…

A recursive least squares algorithm with variable rate forgetting (VRF) is derived by minimizing a quadratic cost function.Under persistent excitation and boundedness of the forgetting factor, the minimizer given by VRF is shown to converge…