Related papers: Asymmetric Feedback Learning in Online Convex Game…
We derive the rate of convergence to the strongly variationally stable Nash equilibrium in a convex game, for a zeroth-order learning algorithm. Though we do not assume strong monotonicity of the game, our rates for the one-point feedback…
This paper considers risk-averse learning in convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their individual risk of incurring significantly high costs. Specifically, the agents adopt the conditional value at risk (CVaR) as a…
Motivated by the stringent safety requirements that are often present in real-world applications, we study a safe online convex optimization setting where the player needs to simultaneously achieve sublinear regret and zero constraint…
In this paper, we propose a passivity-based methodology for analysis and design of reinforcement learning in multi-agent finite games. Starting from a known exponentially-discounted reinforcement learning scheme, we show that convergence to…
Algorithmic game theory (AGT) focuses on the design and analysis of algorithms for interacting agents, with interactions rigorously formalized within the framework of games. Results from AGT find applications in domains such as online…
We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…
Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…
This paper considers repeated games in which one player has more information about the game than the other players. In particular, we investigate repeated two-player zero-sum games where only the column player knows the payoff matrix A of…
No-regret learning has been widely used to compute a Nash equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games. However, there is still a lack of regret analysis for network stochastic zero-sum games, where players competing in two subnetworks only…
We introduce an online learning algorithm in the bandit feedback model that, once adopted by all agents of a congestion game, results in game-dynamics that converge to an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash Equilibrium in a polynomial number of…
We consider risk-averse learning in repeated unknown games where the goal of the agents is to minimize their individual risk of incurring significantly high cost. Specifically, the agents use the conditional value at risk (CVaR) as a risk…
In an inverse game problem, one needs to infer the cost function of the players in a game such that a desired joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium. We study the inverse game problem for a class of multiplayer matrix games, where the cost…
Most of the literature on learning in games has focused on the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Much less is known about the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in dynamic multiagent…
In this paper, we present a framework for multi-agent learning in a nonstationary dynamic network environment. More specifically, we examine projected gradient play in smooth monotone repeated network games in which the agents'…
This paper examines the long-run behavior of learning with bandit feedback in non-cooperative concave games. The bandit framework accounts for extremely low-information environments where the agents may not even know they are playing a…
We propose a stochastic first-order algorithm to learn the rationality parameters of simultaneous and non-cooperative potential games, i.e., the parameters of the agents' optimization problems. Our technique combines (i.) an active-set step…
We study risk-sensitive multi-agent reinforcement learning under general-sum Markov games, where agents optimize the entropic risk measure of rewards with possibly diverse risk preferences. We show that using the regret naively adapted from…
This paper presents a new framework for analyzing and designing no-regret algorithms for dynamic (possibly adversarial) systems. The proposed framework generalizes the popular online convex optimization framework and extends it to its…
We present a novel algorithm for game-theoretic trajectory planning, tailored for settings in which agents can only observe one another in specific regions of the state space. Such problems arise naturally in the context of multi-robot…
We consider quadratic, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems with symmetric interactions among the agents. Albeit this class of games is known to admit a potential function, its formal expression can be unavailable in several…