Related papers: Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions
Common sense suggests that when individuals explain why they believe something, we can arrive at more accurate conclusions than when they simply state what they believe. Yet, there is no known mechanism that provides incentives to elicit…
I study a principal-agent model in which a principal hires an agent to collect information about an unknown continuous state. The agent acquires a signal whose distribution is centered around the state, controlling the signal's precision at…
Several Artificial Intelligence schemes for reasoning under uncertainty explore either explicitly or implicitly asymmetries among probabilities of various states of their uncertain domain models. Even though the correct working of these…
We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an unknown state, so no sender can verify another's report. A…
We study a Bayesian persuasion model with two-dimensional states of the world, in which the sender (she) and receiver (he) have heterogeneous prior beliefs and care about different dimensions. The receiver is a naive agent who has a…
I relax the standard assumptions of transitivity and partition structure in economic models of information to formalize vague knowledge: non-transitive indistinguishability over states. I show that vague knowledge, while failing to…
When people choose what messages to send to others, they often consider how others will interpret the messages. A sender may expect a receiver to engage in motivated reasoning, leading the receiver to trust good news more than bad news,…
We introduce the confident voter model, in which each voter can be in one of two opinions and can additionally have two levels of commitment to an opinion --- confident and unsure. Upon interacting with an agent of a different opinion, a…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
It is well known that individual beliefs cannot be identified using traditional choice data, unless we impose the practically restrictive and conceptually awkward assumption that utilities are state-independent. In this paper, we propose a…
This paper presents a plausible reasoning system to illustrate some broad issues in knowledge representation: dualities between different reasoning forms, the difficulty of unifying complementary reasoning styles, and the approximate nature…
Consensus formation is investigated for multi-agent systems in which agents' beliefs are both vague and uncertain. Vagueness is represented by a third truth state meaning \emph{borderline}. This is combined with a probabilistic model of…
We propose a model of causal persuasion, in which a sender selectively discloses a set of variables together with their true joint distribution and proposes a subjective causal model that binds them. A receiver is persuaded by this model…
It is well known that individual beliefs cannot be identified using traditional choice data, unless we exogenously assume state-independent utilities. In this paper, I propose a novel methodology that solves this long-standing…
The state that an observer attributes to a quantum system depends on the information available to that observer. If two or more observers have different information about a single system, they will in general assign different states. Is…
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which a sender wants to persuade a critical mass of receivers by revealing partial information about the state to them. The homogeneous binary-action receivers are located on a communication…
Over time, there have hen refinements in the way that probability distributions are used for representing beliefs. Models which rely on single probability distributions depict a complete ordering among the propositions of interest, yet…
We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…
States with private correlations but little or no distillable entanglement were recently reported. Here, we consider the secure distribution of such states, i.e., the situation when an adversary gives two parties such states and they have…
It has been observed people tend to have opinions that are far more internally consistent than it would be reasonable to expect. Here, we study how that observation might emerge from changing how agents trust the opinions of their peers in…