Related papers: Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation.…
Under what circumstances can a system be said to have beliefs and goals, and how do such agency-related features relate to its physical state? Recent work has proposed a notion of interpretation map, a function that maps the state of a…
The conditional mutual information I(X;Y|Z) measures the average information that X and Y contain about each other given Z. This is an important primitive in many learning problems including conditional independence testing, graphical model…
I propose a cheap-talk model in which the sender can use private messages and only cares about persuading a subset of her audience. For example, a candidate only needs to persuade a majority of the electorate in order to win an election. I…
This paper proposes a framework in which agents are constrained to use simple models to forecast economic variables and characterizes the resulting biases. It considers agents who can only entertain state-space models with no more than d…
A quantum state represents neither properties of a physical system nor anyone's knowledge of its properties. The important question is not what quantum states represent but how they are used---as informational bridges. Knowing about some…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
A multi-level model of opinion formation is presented which takes into account that attitudes on different issues are usually not independent. In the model, agents exchange beliefs regarding a series of facts. A cognitive structure of…
This work investigates the case of a network of agents that attempt to learn some unknown state of the world amongst the finitely many possibilities. At each time step, agents all receive random, independently distributed private signals…
Spread of information in crowd is analysed in terms of directed percolation in two-dimensional spatial network. We investigate the case when the information transmitted can be incomplete or damaged. The results indicate that for small or…
The linearity of quantum operations puts many fundamental constraints on the information processing tasks we can achieve on a quantum system whose state is not exactly known, just as we observe in quantum cloning and quantum discrimination.…
Multi-agent trajectory forecasting in autonomous driving requires an agent to accurately anticipate the behaviors of the surrounding vehicles and pedestrians, for safe and reliable decision-making. Due to partial observability in these…
In this paper we design information elicitation mechanisms for Bayesian auctions. While in Bayesian mechanism design the distributions of the players' private types are often assumed to be common knowledge, information elicitation considers…
The possibility to explain quantum correlations via (possibly) unknown causal influences propagating gradually and continuously at a finite speed v > c has attracted a lot of attention recently. In particular, it could be shown that this…
Collective intelligence is believed to underly the remarkable success of human society. The formation of accurate shared beliefs is one of the key components of human collective intelligence. How are accurate shared beliefs formed in groups…
We study the bounds of mediated communication in sender-receiver games in which the sender's payoff is state-independent. We show that the feasible distributions over the receiver's beliefs under mediation are those that induce zero…
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is…
A sender with state-independent preferences (i.e., transparent motives) privately observes a signal about the state of the world before sending a message to a receiver, who subsequently takes an action. Regardless of whether the receiver…
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a…
Stability and analysis of multi-agent network systems with state-dependent switching typologies have been a fundamental and longstanding challenge in control, social sciences, and many other related fields. These already complex systems…