Related papers: Synthesising Full-Information Protocols
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…
In settings with incomplete information, players can find it difficult to coordinate to find states with good social welfare. For example, in financial settings, if a collection of financial firms have limited information about each other's…
This paper investigates the implementation and performance of a decentralized information transmission mechanism in game with complete or incomplete games. We propose a mechanism that realizes irrational correlated equilibria or irrational…
Covert planning refers to a class of constrained planning problems where an agent aims to accomplish a task with minimal information leaked to a passive observer to avoid detection. However, existing methods of covert planning often…
We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…
We study the problem of synthesizing strategies for a mobile sensor network to conduct surveillance in partnership with static alarm triggers. We formulate the problem as a multi-agent reactive synthesis problem with surveillance objectives…
We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…
In the timeline-based approach to planning, the evolution over time of a set of state variables (the timelines) is governed by a set of temporal constraints. Traditional timeline-based planning systems excel at the integration of planning…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
We study a two-player, zero-sum, dynamic game with incomplete information where one of the players is more informed than his opponent. We analyze the limit value as the players play more and more frequently. The more informed player…
In dynamic games with asymmetric information structure, the widely used concept of equilibrium is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). This is expressed as a strategy and belief pair that simultaneously satisfy sequential rationality and…
Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…
Robots and autonomous systems must interact with one another and their environment to provide high-quality services to their users. Dynamic game theory provides an expressive theoretical framework for modeling scenarios involving multiple…
This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors' trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on…
In this paper, we consider the problem of synthesis of maximally permissive covert damage-reachable attackers in the setup where the model of the supervisor is unknown to the adversary but the adversary has recorded a (prefix-closed) finite…
We study a general class of dynamic multi-agent decision problems with asymmetric information and non-strategic agents, which includes dynamic teams as a special case. When agents are non-strategic, an agent's strategy is known to the other…
Synthesis of bulletproof strategies in imperfect information scenarios is a notoriously hard problem. In this paper, we suggest that it is sometimes a viable alternative to aim at "reasonably good" strategies instead. This makes sense not…
Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We…
The sequential equilibrium is a standard solution concept for extensive-form games with imperfect information that includes an explicit representation of the players' beliefs. An assessment consisting of a strategy and a belief is a…