Related papers: Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Le…

In this paper, we formulate a two-player zero-sum game under dynamic constraints defined by hybrid dynamical equations. The game consists of a min-max problem involving a cost functional that depends on the actions and resulting solutions…

Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…

We study model-based and model-free policy optimization in a class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games called linear quadratic (LQ) deep structured games. In such games, players interact with each other through a set of weighted…

Self-play methods based on regret minimization have become the state of the art for computing Nash equilibria in large two-players zero-sum extensive-form games. These methods fundamentally rely on the hierarchical structure of the players'…

Sequential equilibrium is one of the most fundamental refinements of Nash equilibrium for games in extensive form. However, it is not defined for extensive-form games in which a player can choose among a continuum of actions. We define a…

The task of computing approximate Nash equilibria in large zero-sum extensive-form games has received a tremendous amount of attention due mainly to the Annual Computer Poker Competition. Immediately after its inception, two competing and…

We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium requiring resilience w.r.t. a specific vanishing perturbation (representing mistakes of…

We consider correlated equilibria in strategic games in an adversarial environment, where an adversary can compromise the public signal used by the players for choosing their strategies, while players aim at detecting a potential attack as…

With the recent advances in solving large, zero-sum extensive form games, there is a growing interest in the inverse problem of inferring underlying game parameters given only access to agent actions. Although a recent work provides a…

Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.…

Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…

The sequence form, owing to its compact and holistic strategy representation, has demonstrated significant efficiency in computing normal-form perfect equilibria for two-player extensive-form games with perfect recall. Nevertheless, the…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…

Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…

We focus on the design of algorithms for finding equilibria in 2-player zero-sum games. Although it is well known that such problems can be solved by a single linear program, there has been a surge of interest in recent years for simpler…

Two-player games on graphs provide the theoretical frame- work for many important problems such as reactive synthesis. While the traditional study of two-player zero-sum games has been extended to multi-player games with several notions of…

In a social system, the self-interest of agents can be detrimental to the collective good, sometimes leading to social dilemmas. To resolve such a conflict, a central designer may intervene by either redesigning the system or incentivizing…

In this work, we consider the problem of a two-player zero-sum game. In the literature, the successive over-relaxation Q-learning algorithm has been developed and implemented, and it is seen to result in a lower contraction factor for the…

In this paper, we delve into the utilization of the negative momentum technique in constrained minimax games. From an intuitive mechanical standpoint, we introduce a novel framework for momentum buffer updating, which extends the findings…