Related papers: Affective interdependence and welfare
We analyze a class of stochastic differential games of singular control, motivated by the study of a dynamic model of interbank lending with benchmark rates. We describe Pareto optima for this game and show how they may be achieved through…
Individual differences in personality determine our preferences, traits and values, which should similarly hold for the way we express ourselves. With current advancements and transformations of technology and society, text-based…
Federated learning offers a decentralized approach to machine learning, where multiple agents collaboratively train a model while preserving data privacy. In this paper, we investigate the decision-making and equilibrium behavior in…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
This work focuses on equilibrium selection in no-conflict multi-agent games, where we specifically study the problem of selecting a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium among several existing equilibria. It has been shown that many…
We analyze a market impact game between $n$ risk averse agents who compete for liquidity in a market impact model with permanent price impact and additional slippage. Most market parameters, including volatility and drift, are allowed to…
The most popular stability notion in games should be Nash equilibrium under the rationality of players who maximize their own payoff individually. In contrast, in many scenarios, players can be (partly) irrational with some unpredictable…
We consider two player quadratic games in a cooperative framework known as social value orientation, motivated by the need to account for complex interactions between humans and autonomous agents in dynamical systems. Social value…
In this paper a consensus has been constructed in a social network which is modeled by a stochastic differential game played by agents of that network. Each agent independently minimizes a cost function which represents their motives. A…
A multi-agent system operates in an uncertain environment about which agents have different and time varying beliefs that, as time progresses, converge to a common belief. A global utility function that depends on the realized state of the…
We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…
Many real-life settings of consumer-choice involve social interactions, causing targeted policies to have spillover-effects. This paper develops novel empirical tools for analyzing demand and welfare-effects of policy-interventions in…
We relate here two formalisms that are used for different purposes in reasoning about multi-agent systems. One of them are strategic games that are used to capture the idea that agents interact with each other while pursuing their own…
We study the welfare structure in two-sided large random matching markets. In the model, each agent has a latent personal score for every agent on the other side of the market and her preferences follow a logit model based on these scores.…
Empirical studies suggest a deep intertwining between opinion formation and decision-making processes, but these have been treated as separate problems in the study of dynamical models for social networks. In this paper, we bridge the gap…
We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…
We can usually assume others have goals analogous to our own. This assumption can also, at times, be applied to multi-agent games - e.g. Agent 1's attraction to green pellets is analogous to Agent 2's attraction to red pellets. This…
Many economic interventions are designed as marginal changes in incentives. Yet in environments shaped by coordination, institutional persistence, and path dependence, such reforms often leave behavior largely unchanged. This paper studies…
Network games provide a framework to study strategic decision making processes that are governed by structured interdependencies among agents. However, existing models do not account for environments in which agents simultaneously interact…
This paper describes a novel method for building affectively intelligent human-interactive agents. The method is based on a key sociological insight that has been developed and extensively verified over the last twenty years, but has yet to…