Related papers: Stable Dinner Party Seating Arrangements

In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…

In the well-studied Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of agents into pairs, where no two agents prefer each other over their assigned partners. However, some instances of this problem are unsolvable, lacking any stable…

The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood.…

We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property…

We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…

We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…

We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of…

We consider the situation in which an organizer is trying to convene an event, and needs to choose a subset of agents to be invited. Agents have preferences over how many attendees should be at the event and possibly also who the attendees…

We study the problem of assigning agents to the vertices of a graph such that no pair of neighbors can benefit from swapping assignments -- a property we term neighborhood stability. We further assume that agents' utilities are based solely…

We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…

Finding an envy-free allocation of indivisible resources to agents is a central task in many multiagent systems. Often, non-trivial envy-free allocations do not exist, and, when they do, finding them can be computationally hard. Classical…

We introduce a new class of network allocation games called graphical distance preservation games. Here, we are given a graph, called a topology, and a set of agents that need to be allocated to its vertices. Moreover, every agent has an…

We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…

The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating the vertices of a graph among $n$ agents, where the value of a bundle is determined by its cut value -- the number of edges with exactly one endpoint in the bundle. This model naturally captures…

In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…

We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…

We study the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. This model involves three types of agents, with an equal number of agents of each type. The types form a cyclic order such that each agent has a complete…

A recently introduced restricted variant of the multidimensional stable roommate problem is the roommate diversity problem: each agent belongs to one of two types (e.g., red and blue), and the agents' preferences over the coalitions solely…