Related papers: Signaling With Commitment
We present a quantization scheme for a three-player Prisoner's Dilemma game. It is shown that entanglement plays a dominant role in the three-player quantum game. Four different types of payoffs are identified on the basis of different…
Game theory serves as a powerful tool for distributed optimization in multi-agent systems in different applications. In this paper we consider multi-agent systems that can be modeled by means of potential games whose potential function…
We consider a signaling game originally introduced by Skyrms, which models how two interacting players learn to signal each other and thus create a common language. The first rigorous analysis was done by Argiento, Pemantle, Skyrms and…
We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has…
Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where…
We are interested in studying how heterogeneous agents can learn to communicate and cooperate with each other without being explicitly pre-programmed to do so. Motivated by this goal, we present and analyze a distributed solution to a…
We present a quantum approach to a signaling game; a special kind of extensive games of incomplete information. Our model is based on quantum schemes for games in strategic form where players perform unitary operators on their own qubits of…
To what extent can an external observer observing an equilibrium action distribution in an incomplete information game infer the underlying information structure? We investigate this issue in a general linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework. A…
This paper explores the problem of mediated communication enhanced by money-burning tactics for commitment power. In our model, the sender has state-independent preferences and can design a communication mechanism that both transmits…
Deception plays critical roles in economics and technology, especially in emerging interactions in cyberspace. Holistic models of deception are needed in order to analyze interactions and to design mechanisms that improve them. Game theory…
This paper considers linear quadratic team decision problems where the players in the team affect each other's information structure through their decisions. Whereas the stochastic version of the problem is well known to be complex with…
We study a signaling game between an employer and a potential employee, where the employee has private information regarding their production capacity. At the initial stage, the employee communicates a salary claim, after which the true…
Selection of input features such as relevant pieces of text has become a common technique of highlighting how complex neural predictors operate. The selection can be optimized post-hoc for trained models or incorporated directly into the…
We study a referential game (a type of signaling game) where two agents communicate with each other via a discrete bottleneck to achieve a common goal. In our referential game, the goal of the speaker is to compose a message or a symbolic…
In this paper we provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily having transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is…
Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
This paper develops a data-driven approach to Bayesian persuasion. The receiver is privately informed about the prior distribution of the state of the world, the sender knows the receiver's preferences but does not know the distribution of…
The off-switch problem is a critical challenge in AI control: if an AI system resists being switched off, it poses a significant risk. In this paper, we model the off-switch problem as a signalling game, where a human decision-maker…
We study the instrumental value of conceptual knowledge when making statistical decisions. Such knowledge tells agents how unknown, payoff-relevant states relate. It is distinct from the statistical knowledge gained from observing signals…