Related papers: Signaling With Commitment
A communication game consists of distributed parties attempting to jointly complete a task with restricted communication. Such games are useful tools for studying limitations of physical theories. A theory exhibits preparation contextuality…
Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…
Models of social learning feature either binary signals or abstract signal structures often deprived of micro-foundations. Both models are limited when analyzing interim results or performing empirical analysis. We present a method of…
In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…
We investigate a coordination model for a two-stage collective decision-making problem within the framework of global games. The agents observe noisy signals of a shared random variable, referred to as the fundamental, which determines the…
Many high-stakes decision-making problems, such as those found within cybersecurity and economics, can be modeled as competitive resource allocation games. In these games, multiple players must allocate limited resources to overcome their…
What payoffs are positionally determined for deterministic two-player antagonistic games on finite directed graphs? In this paper we study this question for payoffs that are continuous. The main reason why continuous positionally determined…
We analyze, both analytically and numerically, the self-organization of a system of "selfish" adaptive agents playing an arbitrary iterated pairwise game (defined by a 2X2 payoff matrix). Examples of possible games to play are: the…
Communication is essential for coordination among humans and animals. Therefore, with the introduction of intelligent agents into the world, agent-to-agent and agent-to-human communication becomes necessary. In this paper, we first study…
We revisit the classic job-market signaling model of \cite{spence1973job}, introducing profit-seeking schools as intermediaries that design the mapping from candidates' efforts to job-market signals. Each school commits to an attendance fee…
We consider a coalitional game with the same payoff for all players. To maximize the payoff, the players need to use one collective strategy, if all players are in certain states, and the other strategy otherwise. The current state of each…
We investigate a group choice problem of agents pursuing social status. We assume heterogeneous agents want to signal their private information (ability, income, patience, altruism, etc.) to others, facing tradeoff between "outside status"…
Motivated by safety-critical classification problems, we investigate adversarial attacks against cost-sensitive classifiers. We use current state-of-the-art adversarially-resistant neural network classifiers [1] as the underlying models.…
We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the…
This paper presents an approach that brings together game theory with grammatical inference and discrete abstractions in order to synthesize control strategies for hybrid dynamical systems performing tasks in partially unknown but…
Bayesian persuasion, a central model in information design, studies how a sender, who privately observes a state drawn from a prior distribution, strategically sends a signal to influence a receiver's action. A key assumption is that both…
This paper studies learning in markets with aggregate uncertainty about whether trade is efficient. A long-lived seller offers prices to buyers, who are short-lived and arrive according to a Poisson process. A hidden state determines…
Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…
Stackelberg games (SGs) constitute the most fundamental and acclaimed models of strategic interactions involving some form of commitment. Moreover, they form the basis of more elaborate models of this kind, such as, e.g., Bayesian…
Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…