The Limits of Limited Commitment
Theoretical Economics
2025-02-20 v5
Abstract
We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by her Stackelberg and Cournot payoffs. Under general commitment structures the leader may obtain a payoff that is less than her lowest Cournot payoff. We apply our results to a textbook duopoly model and elicit the commitment structures leading to consumer- and producer-optimal outcomes.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2205.05546,
title = {The Limits of Limited Commitment},
author = {Jacopo Bizzotto and Toomas Hinnosaar and Adrien Vigier},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.05546},
year = {2025}
}