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In this paper, we present an online learning approach for two-player zero-sum linear quadratic games with unknown dynamics. We develop a framework combining regularized least squares model estimation, high probability confidence sets, and…

We introduce, to our knowledge, the first direct second-order method for computing Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. To do so, we construct a Douglas-Rachford-style splitting formulation, which we then solve with a semi-smooth…

We study online learning and equilibrium computation in games with polyhedral decision sets, a property shared by both normal-form games and extensive-form games (EFGs), when the learning agent is restricted to using a best-response oracle.…

We study offline learning in KL-regularized two-player zero-sum games, where policies are optimized with respect to a fixed reference policy through KL regularization. Prior work relies on pessimistic value estimation to handle distribution…

We suggest a general method for inferring players' values from their actions in repeated games. The method extends and improves upon the recent suggestion of (Nekipelov et al., EC 2015) and is based on the assumption that players are more…

No-regret learning has emerged as a powerful tool for solving extensive-form games. This was facilitated by the counterfactual-regret minimization (CFR) framework, which relies on the instantiation of regret minimizers for simplexes at each…

Self-play methods based on regret minimization have become the state of the art for computing Nash equilibria in large two-players zero-sum extensive-form games. These methods fundamentally rely on the hierarchical structure of the players'…

We study fast rates of convergence in the setting of nonparametric online regression, namely where regret is defined with respect to an arbitrary function class which has bounded complexity. Our contributions are two-fold: - In the…

We describe a new complete algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer general-sum games, based on a quadratically-constrained feasibility program formulation. We demonstrate that the algorithm runs significantly faster than the…

This paper studies a variant of two-player zero-sum matrix games, where, at each timestep, the row player selects row $i$, the column player selects column $j$, and the row player receives a noisy reward with expected value $A_{i,j}$, along…

The task of computing approximate Nash equilibria in large zero-sum extensive-form games has received a tremendous amount of attention due mainly to the Annual Computer Poker Competition. Immediately after its inception, two competing and…

In order to find Nash-equilibria for two-player zero-sum games where each player plays combinatorial objects like spanning trees, matchings etc, we consider two online learning algorithms: the online mirror descent (OMD) algorithm and the…

We establish the first uncoupled learning algorithm that attains $O(n \log^2 d \log T)$ per-player regret in multi-player general-sum games, where $n$ is the number of players, $d$ is the number of actions available to each player, and $T$…

We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…

We give a simple and computationally efficient algorithm that, for any constant $\varepsilon>0$, obtains $\varepsilon T$-swap regret within only $T = \mathsf{polylog}(n)$ rounds; this is an exponential improvement compared to the…

No-regret self-play learning dynamics have become one of the premier ways to solve large-scale games in practice. Accelerating their convergence via improving the regret of the players over the naive $O(\sqrt{T})$ bound after $T$ rounds has…

Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games. State-of-the-art methods rely on minimizing regret locally at each decision point. In this work we derive a new framework for regret minimization on…

We study two-player general sum repeated finite games where the rewards of each player are generated from an unknown distribution. Our aim is to find the egalitarian bargaining solution (EBS) for the repeated game, which can lead to much…

Regret minimization has proved to be a versatile tool for tree-form sequential decision making and extensive-form games. In large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games, modern extensions of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR)…

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility…