Related papers: Random evolutionary games and random polynomials
The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
Interactions among living organisms, from bacteria colonies to human societies, are inherently more complex than interactions among particles and nonliving matter. Group interactions are a particularly important and widespread class,…
We discuss the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…
In this paper we study a type of games regularized by the relative entropy, where the players' strategies are coupled through a random environment variable. Besides the existence and the uniqueness of equilibria of such games, we prove that…
Evolution algebras are non-associative algebras inspired from biological phenomena, with applications to or connections with different mathematical fields. There are two natural ways to define an evolution algebra associated to a given…
Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the…
We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner's dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended co-evolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria,…
A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…
We examine kinetic symmetry breaking phenomena in an evolutionary political game in which voters, inhabiting a multidimensional ideological space, cast ballots via selection mechanisms subject to the competing forces of conformity and…
We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. Our main algorithm is for two-player games, and we describe how it can be extended to…
We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…
The Letter presents a novel way to connect random walks, stochastic differential equations, and evolutionary game theory. We introduce a new concept of potential function for discrete-space stochastic systems. It is based on a…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
We study the effect of speciation, i.e. the introduction of new species through evolution into communities, in the setting of predator-prey systems. Predator-prey dynamics is classically well modeled by Lotka-Volterra equations, also when…
A systematic theory is introduced that describes stochastic effects in game theory. In a biological context, such effects are relevant for the evolution of finite populations with frequency-dependent selection. They are characterized by…
In evolutionary game theory an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept that is sometimes also recognized as evolutionary stability. It is a game-theoretic model, well known to mathematical…
We study the asymptotic stability of the logit evolutionary dynamics in population games, possibly with multiple heterogenous populations. For general population games, we prove that, on the one hand, strict Nash equilibria are…
We study the influence of complex graphs on the metastability and fixation properties of a set of evolutionary processes. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, where the fitness and selection are frequency-dependent and vary with…