Population Fragmentation and Party Dynamics in an Evolutionary Political Game
Statistical Mechanics
2007-05-23 v1
Abstract
We examine kinetic symmetry breaking phenomena in an evolutionary political game in which voters, inhabiting a multidimensional ideological space, cast ballots via selection mechanisms subject to the competing forces of conformity and dissent. Our understanding of the spatiotemporally complex population dynamics is informed by a system of nonlinear replicator equations, discrete deterministic cousin of the original stochastic Seceder Model.
Cite
@article{arxiv.cond-mat/0305356,
title = {Population Fragmentation and Party Dynamics in an Evolutionary Political Game},
author = {Arne Soulier and Tim Halpin-Healy},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:cond-mat/0305356},
year = {2007}
}
Comments
4 Pages; 5 Figures; PRL format; for additional info, and a Seceder applet, see http://urania.barnard.edu/~mass/index.html